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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the amount of information independent directors possess about
their company, by comparing their trading performance in the company stock to that of the
oﬃcers of the ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that they earn positive and substantial abnormal returns when they
purchase the company stock, and that the diﬀerence with the insiders is relatively small at most
horizons. The results are robust to controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the size of the transaction
and stock holdings in the ﬁrm, ﬁrm’s size and book to market, and past return volatility. Both
oﬃcers and independent directors make higher returns in the very worst governed ﬁrms and
the gap between these two groups widens in such ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence that
independent directors sitting on the audit committee, and attending more meetings, are more
informed than others, and that larger boards are worse for insiders’ performance, but beneﬁcial
for the outsiders. To check for the possibility that the outsiders are overall well informed, but
only when the oﬃcers want so, rather than when it is more crucial to monitor the management,
we analyze the trading performance in ﬁrms that have been involved in earning restatements.
Our ﬁndings suggest that independent directors were informed about the ﬁrm, although to a
lesser extent than the insiders.
∗We would like to thank Eliezer Fich, Debbie Lucas, Randall Morck, Ioanid Rosu, Geoﬀrey Tate and Michael Weis-
bach for inspiring conversations at the beginning of this project, and seminar participants at Northwestern University
for their comments. We also thank Eliezer Fich for sharing his board size data with us. The usual caveat applies.
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1I Introduction
In this paper we investigate the amount of information independent directors possess about their
company, by comparing their trading performance in the company stock to that of the oﬃcers of
the ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that the market-adjusted returns associated to the purchase transactions of these
individuals is positive and substantial, and that the diﬀerence in their performance is relatively small
at most horizons.
We also analyze the eﬀect on trading performance of governance quality, and various institutional
settings of the ﬁrm that might aﬀect the mechanism through which the directors acquire the infor-
mation. We ﬁnd that both oﬃcers and independent directors make higher returns in the very worst
governed ﬁrms, and that the gap between these two groups widens as well. We also ﬁnd suggestive
evidence that independent directors sitting on the audit committee, and attending more meetings, are
more informed than others, and that larger boards are worse for insiders performance, but beneﬁcial
for the outsiders.
After recent scandals, policymakers around the world have responded by creating codes to improve
ethical standards in business (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (in U.S.), the Cadbury Report, and the Smith
Report (in U.K.)). A common theme in these guidelines is the independence of boards of directors
that oversee corporate managers. For example, in 2002, the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
submitted proposals that required that boards had a majority of independent directors with no
material relationships with the company. An outsider is deﬁned as someone who has never worked
at the company, is not related to any of the key employees and does not/did not work for a major
supplier or customer.
The rationale for this policy recommendation is that board members with close business relation-
ships with the company or personal ties with high-ranking oﬃcers may not assess its performance
and practices dispassionately.
Despite the consensus on the importance of independent directors in the board, the existing
literature has found no evidence on a relationship between companies’ ﬁnancial performance and the
proportion of outside directors in the board. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991, 1999), Mehran (1995),
Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2001) all report insigniﬁcant relationships between accounting
performance measures and the fraction of outside directors on the board. In addition, Hermalin
and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2001) ﬁnd no relationship between Tobin’s Q and the
proportion of outside directors.1
There are two possible interpretations of these results. First, some argue that most of the studies
1Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) is an excellent review of the literature.
1focused on a period of time in which there was limited activism of the boards. For example, Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2001) say that in the 1980s boards exerted limited oversight on the management. In
fact, MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) ﬁnd that CalPERS’ grading of the board, a practice developed
by CalPERS only in recent years, is positively correlated with measures of performance. More active
monitoring by boards in the 1990s could also be the result of higher incentive-based compensation for
directors (Perry, 2000). Second, some criticize the emphasis on independent board members, based
on the claim that while outsiders are independent in their scrutiny they have much less information
than insiders. If the insiders want to act against the interest of the shareholders, they can simply
leave outsiders in the dark. Thus, their monitoring could be extremely ineﬀective, as they have very
limited information. For example, Warren Buﬀet has often argued that ”independent” non executive
directors are in reality supine and often kept in the dark by executive counterparts.
In this paper, we take a ﬁrst look at the question of whether independent directors have enough
information to monitor the company’s executives by analyzing the trading behavior of independent
directors when they trade the company’s stock. We compare the trading proﬁts of three types of
individuals: (i) executives of the ﬁrm (insiders), (ii) directors who have no business or familial ties
to the ﬁrm or the executives, nor own large blocks of the company stock (independent directors, or
outsiders), and (iii) non executive directors who own more than 10% of the equity (outside block-
holders). The rationale of this exercise is that a necessary condition for independent directors to be
eﬀective monitors is that they have access to information. By looking at the trading behavior of the
independent directors, we will try to infer the quality of information they have while serving on the
board and, therefore, the potential ability to monitor the behavior of the chief executives.
Using a comprehensive sample of reported board of executives’ and directors’ transactions from
1986-2003 in U.S. companies, we ﬁnd that insiders, deﬁned as current oﬃcers of the ﬁrm, earn higher
abnormal returns than the market and that so do independent directors. We focus on purchases
transactions, as they are more information sensitive than sales transactions: since these individuals
tend to be overexposed to the company stock and might sell for diversiﬁcation purposes or just
rebalancing their portfolios after a grant.The diﬀerence between the returns earned by insiders and
independent directors is relatively small at most of the horizons analyzed. The results are robust to
the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect in the regression, to be able to compare insiders and outsiders within
the same ﬁrm and control for time invariant ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics that might aﬀect returns,
as well as individuals’ incentives and constraints. The results are also robust to controlling for the
evolution of ﬁrm characteristics that might aﬀect returns, such as ﬁrm size and book to market, and
past return volatility. Consistent with the insider trading literature we ﬁnd that controlling for size
and book to market leads to lower, yet still positive, trading returns. The results do not change after
2controlling for the size of the trade, and the size of the individual’s holdings of the company’s stock.
Finally, to make sure that few extremely large transactions do not unduly inﬂuence our results, we
repeat the regressions after dropping from the sample transactions in the largest one percent within
each group of individuals, and ﬁnd no change.
We also look at whether performance of insiders and independent directors diﬀer depending on the
governance index of the ﬁrm using the classiﬁcation of Gompers et al. (2003). Better governance may
aﬀect both the performance of insiders and outsiders when they trade in the company stock. There
is some evidence in the literature (Giannetti and Simonov, 2005) that shows that insider trading is
more common in ﬁrms with weak governance structure. In better governed ﬁrms the executive feel
more restrained from trading on private information. As a consequence, in these ﬁrms the diﬀerence
between independent directors and insiders proﬁt would be smaller, and the insiders would make less
money compared to the market. On the other hand, ﬁrms with better governance structure could
have better mechanisms in place that allow independent directors to receive more information. For
example, in some companies, the independent directors meet with the audit committee without the
CEO. Also, in this case, the wedge between independent directors and insiders diminishes as the
independent directors have access to more information. We ﬁnd evidence for the second story: the
performance of executives and independent directors are similar for ﬁrms with better governance
index while independent directors perform worse than insiders in ﬁrms with worse governance index.
At the same time we do not ﬁnd evidence that insiders and independent directors of better governed
ﬁrms trade less than similar individuals in ﬁrms with a worse governance index.
We also check how the individuals on the board acquire information about the ﬁrm. In par-
ticular, we check how much information outside directors obtain through their committee work and
attendance to board meetings, as opposed to informal channels and personal contact with the manage-
ment, or independent research and prior knowledge of similar companies. We ﬁnd that independent
directors beneﬁt from sitting on the audit committee, and earn an additional return of 3.21% at the
longest horizon. There are many reasons why certain committees are associated with higher average
returns, and, more generally, independent directors earn positive abnormal returns. One reason is
that their duties involve the acquisition of diﬀerent types and degrees of information, which the di-
rectors can then use in their trading. An alternative explanation is that the insiders give trading tips
to the indipendent directors to bribe them. Distinguishing between these two conﬂicting hypotheses
is very hard. Nevertheless, if the insiders reward directors by providing them with more/less inside
information, we would expect that the best performing independent directors are those sitting on
the compensation and nominating committee. On the contrary, if independent director acquire in-
formation about the ﬁrm irrespective of whether it is good or bad for the insiders, audit committee
3members, who have a better knowledge of the ﬁnancial statements, should enjoy higher returns.
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of various internal governance mechanisms on the diﬀerence between
insiders and outsiders within a given ﬁrm. In particular, we check whether the information that
independent directors have about the ﬁrm also depends on other features of the corporate boards
that have been shown by previous studies to matter for monitoring eﬀectiveness, such as board size
and directors attendance. We ﬁnd that independent directors do better in bigger boards, possibly
because more independent directors serve on such board and that attendance positively aﬀects the
trading performance of the outsiders, but not of the insiders.
Finally, we examine more closely those ﬁrms in which there have been problems to see if there
the outsiders were indeed aware of these problems and this is reﬂected in their trading performance.
Repeating the regressions on a subsample of ﬁrms that underwent an earnings restatement indicates
that independent directors were informed about the ﬁrm, although to a lesser extent than the insiders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data
and investigate whether independent directors have enough money at stake to have the incentive
to tarde optimally, and whether our sample of ﬁrms and individuals is representative of the larger
universe of U.S. ﬁrms. In Section 3 we discuss our results. Section 4 contains various robustness
checks. We repeat the analyses using a stricter deﬁnition of independence, to make sure that the
results are not simply the eﬀect of a misclassiﬁcation. We also control for ﬁrm characteristics that
might inﬂuence returns irrespective of whom is trading, such as size, book to market and past return
volatility. In Section 5 we examine the eﬀect of governance quality and we investigate in more detail
the mechanisms through which the independent directors can acquire information, such as the eﬀect
of committee memberships, board size, attendance and the presence of large institutional investors.
In Section 6 we focus on ﬁrms that underwent an earning restatement. Section 7 contains extensions
to the paper that are the object of future research, and Section 8 concludes.
II The Trades of Insiders and Independent Directors in the
Company Stock
A Data Description
Our main source of data is the TFN Insider Filing Data, which contain information on all corporate
insider trading activity reported on SEC Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144 from 1986 to 2003.2 The Securities
2More speciﬁcally, Form 3 contains an initial statement of beneﬁcial ownership for all individuals required to ﬁle
with the SEC. Form 4 contains changes in ownership position, including stock purchases, sales, option grants, option
exercises, and gifts. Form 5 contains the annual statement of change in beneﬁcial ownership, and exempt transactions
4and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all individuals that have ”access to non-public, material, insider
information” to report sales or acquisitions of the company’s securities to the SEC. These individuals
include the company’s oﬃcers, directors, and beneﬁcial owners of more than 10% of the company’s
stock. The data set contains the name of each ﬁler, the various positions she holds in the ﬁrm (i.e.
President, VP, large blockholder), the date of the transaction, the number of shares bought/sold, the
price paid/received, and the size of her resulting holdings in the company stock.
To investigate the diﬀerent degrees of information that independent directors and insiders might
have about the company, we merge the data with the CRSP data set, and examine the returns at
diﬀerent horizons from mimicking the trades of the following categories of individuals: (i) executives of
the ﬁrm (insiders), (ii) directors who have no business or familial ties to the ﬁrm or the executives, nor
own large blocks of the company stock (independent directors, or outsiders), and (iii) non executive
directors who own more than 10% of the equity (outside blockholders).3 Although the focus of our
analysis is the trading activity of the ﬁrst two groups, we analyze the transactions of the outside
blockholders as well. Despite not related to the oﬃcers, these individuals should be distinguished
from other outside directors because they might have better access to information, or more incentives
to trade optimally, given their large stake in the company.4
To capture information-driven trading activity that does not follow mechanically from stock or
option grants, we focus on open market sales and purchases and we control for stock holdings in the
regression analyses. In addition, we are able to identify open market transactions that are fully or
partially related to the exercise of an option, and avoid double counting and misclassiﬁcations.5
After excluding utilities and ﬁnancial companies, which are subject to speciﬁc regulations, and
dropping ﬁrms for which less than 200 daily returns are available in CRSP prior to the transaction
date, we are left with 586,828 trades, involving 89,903 individuals and 8,913 ﬁrms. The individuals
in our data set make 527,999 transactions. Of these transactions, 305,349 are made by insiders of the
ﬁrm, 196,211 by independent directors, and 26,439 by large blockholders who are also independent
directors.
Panel A of Table I displays the summary statistics for the whole sample. Consistent with the
literature on insider trading, we ﬁnd that both insiders and independent directors are net sellers:
not reported on Form 4, and Form 144 contains any declarations of intention to sell restricted stock.
3The Appendix contains the list of titles that we categorize in each of these three groups. Transactions executed by
relatives, and those originating from indirect ownership, are attributed directly to the individual.
4Also, to the extent that some outside blockholders are misclassiﬁed into the independent director category, we
want to make sure that the returns enjoyed by the independent directors are not the consequence of such potential
misclassiﬁcation.
5The acquisition of a share of company stock through the exercise of an option is not included among the purchases
in our data set, as the share has not been acquired through an open market transaction. However, if the insider decides
to sell such share, the resulting transaction will be classiﬁed as an open market sale, and included in our data set.
The sales related to the exercise of an option are 39%, 20% and 8% of the sales transactions made by the insiders, the
independent directors, and the outside blockholders, respectively.
5sales represents 66% of the overall transactions made by these individuals, and have a higher mean
value than purchases. This diﬀerence is at least partly due to diversiﬁcation motives, and portfolio
rebalancing after stock grants and option exercises. The average (median) value of the sale transac-
tions is $456,600 ($94,200) for insiders, $800,000 ($85,500) for independent directors, and $2,121,411
($121,300) for large blockholders. The average (median) value of the purchase transactions is $72,730
($8,711) for insiders, $184,000 ($13,000) for the independent directors, and $223,000 ($12,500) for
large blockholders. Consistent with the nature of the trade data, the sample is highly skewed, with
few individuals executing very big transactions. To make sure that such trades do not unduly inﬂu-
ence our results, we repeat the regressions after dropping from the sample transactions in the largest
one percent within each group of individuals, and ﬁnd that the results do not change.
Independent directors tend to make fewer and bigger transactions than the insiders, and display
more balance between the number of sales and purchases they make. Also, the distribution of their
transactions is slightly more skewed than that of the insiders, especially for the sales. Therefore, to
the extent that transactions of higher value provide more incentives to trade optimally, it is going
to be important for a correct interpretation of the results to control for the size of the transactions
in the regressions. Finally, the trades made by large outside blockholders are fewer, sizably bigger,
and display higher skewness and variation across individuals than those of the other two groups of
individuals.
An important issue for our study is whether these individuals, and especially the independent
directors, have enough money at stake for their trades to reﬂect the information they possess. Table I
shows that holdings of the company stock are conspicuous for all the three categories, and suggests that
they have the incentive to trade optimally. The average (median) value of stock holdings is 12.2 million
dollars ($360,028) for insiders, 12 million dollars ($283,774) for independent directors, and 71 million
dollars ($6,407,808) for large outside blockholders. One might be surprised that the outside directors
have bigger holdings than the insiders. This is not a speciﬁc feature of our sample. Yermack (2003)
collected information on outside directors elected to the board of Fortune 500 companies between 1994
and 1996. He shows that stock ownership increases with tenure and that outside directors in their
ﬁfth year have average (median) stock holdings of $8,481,000 ($375,000). The maximum holdings for
outsiders with a tenure of ﬁve years is $3.5B. These values are comparable to those in our sample,
where the average and median tenure for a director are 11 and 8 years, respectively.
Despite this evidence, one might still be concerned that the results are driven by the presence on
the board of investors that own a big stake in the ﬁrm, but less than 10% of the equity, and thus are
classiﬁed as independent directors. The analysis of the large outside blockholder category allows an
indirect investigation of the eﬀect on the returns of this potential misclassiﬁcation.
6The data also show high skewness and large variation across individuals, especially within the
oﬃcers’ group. For comparison, notice that stock ownership of the top ﬁve oﬃcers in the ﬁrm, obtained
from Compustat, is similar in magnitude, although it displays less variation and less skewness. The
diﬀerence could be due to the fact that our insiders category comprises many other oﬃcers in addition
to the top ﬁve executives. To make sure that the trades of few individuals with extremely large
holdings do not inﬂuence the results, we replicate the regressions dropping from the sample the
trades corresponding to the top 1% of holdings value in each of the three groups, and the results do
not change.
Another important issue is whether our sample is representative of the universe of U.S. ﬁrms and,
relatedly, how many ﬁrms give equity compensation to their directors. Yermack (2003) documents
that 77% of the directors in his sample receive either stock or options awards, and Perry (2000)
shows that the trend toward equity-based compensation for directors has been increasing over time.
Moreover, outside directors can acquire the company stock through open market purchases, even if
they are not awarded shares by the ﬁrm. Further, an examination of ﬁrm characteristics such as size,
book to market, governance deciles and return volatility, indicates that our sample is representative of
the ﬁrms in Compustat over the period between 1986 and 2003. The average size of the ﬁrm, measured
as the natural logarithm of the ﬁrms’ assets, is 5.5, compared to the Compustat value of 5.03, while
the average book to market value is 0.35 in our sample, compared to 0.60 in Compustat. A breakdown
of the ﬁrms by governance index indicates that all the deciles are approximately equally represented
in the sample, with the exception of the three deciles with worse governance that constitute only 7, 6
and 4.59 percent of the transactions, respectively. Finally, the average ﬁrm return volatility, measured
as the standard deviation of the daily market-adjusted returns over the period between 380 and 20
trading days prior to the transaction, equals 0.03 daily, and 0.1785 monthly. This evidence suggest
that the results are generalizable to a larger universe of ﬁrms than those in our data set.
Another potential concern is that independent directors trade very infrequently and only when
they have private information, and consequently good performance relatively to the market does not
imply that they are able to access information all the time, nor that they have information at times
in which is important to monitor. To quantify whether this issue is important, in Figure I we break
down the average numbers of transactions by time of the year for each group of individuals. Figure I
shows that outsiders trade uniformly throughout the year. Possibly due to blackout periods and fear
of violating insider trading regulations, the average number of trades diminishes for both insiders and
independent directors around quarterly announcement dates, but more so for insiders. Since this is
an average across ﬁrms, a more precise test would make this comparison within each ﬁrm. This is
the object of a future revision of the paper.
7To further investigate whether individual and ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence returns, and to poten-
tially shed light on the mechanism through which the information ﬂows, we combine the stocks trades
from the SEC with data on individual demographic characteristics, tenure, committee memberships,
and number of other directorships from the IRRC data set (1996-2003), board characteristics from
Fich and Shivdasani (2005), ﬁrm characteristics from Compustat, and the Governance Index con-
structed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Panel B and C of Table 1 contain the summary
statistics for the subset of transactions for which such information is available. Panel B illustrates
the breakdown of individuals into committees, the frequency of possible links between the individual
and the ﬁrm that could impair the director’s independence, and various demographic characteristics.
The audit and the compensation committees are the most common, with 13.30% and 12.47% of the
individual-ﬁrm-year combinations, while the nominating, corporate governance and executive com-
mittees represent a smaller fraction of the data, either because they are smaller in size, or because they
have been established more recently and do not account for many observations yet. If we look into the
demographic characteristics and the links with the company, the number of director-company-year
combinations for which we have information drops to less than half, from 49,457 to 15,645. Of these
observations, most cases refer to individuals that are former employees (8.53% of the observations),
made business transactions with (2.69%), or provided professional services to the ﬁrm (6.62%). Fi-
nally, we have information on interlocking with other companies boards (0.92% of the observations),
poor attendance (less than 75% of the meetings), being a director designated by a big investor, age
(average is 57), tenure, and institutional holdings (on average 58.7%).
Panel C contains summary statistics for the ﬁrms for which board size from Fich and Shivdasani
(2005) is available. The board size data have been collected by Fich and Shivdasani for the Fortune
1000 ﬁrms, and are described in detail in their paper. After the merge we are left with 2,739,886
trades, corresponding to 12.97% of the original observations, 1,350 of the original 10,564 ﬁrms, and
56,481 of 446,315 individuals. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Fich and Shivdasani (2005), Yermack
(1996), and others, the average and median board size is at around 10, with a standard deviation of
2.625.
Finally, to further study the concern that independent directors might not have information at
exactly the times at which it would be crucial to have it for monitoring purposes, we repeat our
analyses for the ﬁrms that between January 1997 and June 2002 restated their earnings due to
accounting irregularities. The sample is collected by the U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) and
provides information on the reason of the restatement, whether it was prompted by the company or an
external entity (i.e. the SEC/auditor/FASB), and the date the restatement has been announced. Of
these 919 restatement cases, 309 involve ﬁrms in our data set. Most ﬁrms experience one restatement,
8while 14 ﬁrms experience two, and 4 ﬁrms three restatements. Overall, these 309 cases involve 287
ﬁrms, 5,703 individuals and 27,850 trades and account for 5.28% of the original data set. The GAO
data set is the only publicly available source of information on restatements and it is widely used.
One drawback of the data is the lack of information on the economic size of restatements, with
the consequence that it is possible to estimate their economic impact only indirectly through their
eﬀect on the returns. The economic impact that is not captured by subsequent returns adds noise
to the ﬁndings, but does not bias them in favor of ﬁnding a small diﬀerence between insiders and
independent directors. To further address this issue we also control for whether the restatements are
due to revenue recognition, which according to Anderson et al. (2002) yields the most pronounced
negative market reaction. Such restatements constitute 41.56% of our sample, while cases in which
the restatement was prompted by an external party, such as the SEC, FASB, or an auditor, account
for 25.81% of the transactions.
To make sure that there are no biases due to the speciﬁcity of the sample analyzed, Panels B
through D also reproduce the summary statistics reported in Panel A for the various subsamples. In
this respect, ﬁrms that have committee information are bigger, have higher market to book values
than the whole sample, while the individuals tend to have higher stock holdings. The same is true for
the subsample for which the size of the board is available and the ﬁrms that restated their earnings.
As expected, the latter group also tend to have worse governance, with an average governance index
of 11, as opposed to the 9 of the other samples.
Given these diﬀerences across samples, before adding any control variables we re-estimate all the
regressions performed on the whole sample on each of the subsample to check whether any diﬀerence
in the ﬁndings is due to the controls or just to diﬀerent samples.
III Empirical Results
To investigate the informativeness of the trades of insiders, independent directors, and large outside
block-holders, we ﬁrst perform an event study, and examine the average and median returns earned
at various horizons by mimicking the trades of these individuals. Then, we re-evaluate our ﬁndings
within a regression framework to control for various individual, ﬁrm and transaction characteristics
more ﬂexibly, and, most important, to compare insiders and independent directors within the same
ﬁrm, through the use of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Like most of the literature, we calculate the return from investing one dollar in the same way as
the individual does, by either purchasing one dollar worth of the company stock when she buys, or by
9shorting one dollar worth of the company stock when she sells.6 Figure II and III show the evolution
over time of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), raw returns, and market-adjusted buy-and-hold
returns (BHARs) for purchase and sale transactions, respectively. We analyze purchases and sales
separately, since for individuals whose portfolios are highly tied to the ﬁrm, due to salary, stock, and
option grants, purchases are more likely to be information-driven, while sales might reﬂect portfolio
rebalancing and diversiﬁcation.
We deﬁne an event window around the time of the trade that spans the 20 days preceding the
transaction, up to 180 days after it. Following the methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983), for every
trade we calculate daily abnormal returns (AR) as
ARit = Rit − (αi + βiRmt) (1)
where Rit is the company stock daily return, Rmt is the value weighted daily return for the market
portfolio, while αi and βi are the coeﬃcients from the regression of Rit on the market return over
the 360 trading days preceding the event window. Cumulative abnormal returns are obtained by
summing the daily abnormal returns, and average and median CARs are computed for each category
of traders separately. Raw returns are given by Rit, and averaged within each group of individuals for
each of the 200 trading days in the event window. Similarly, market-adjusted returns are calculated
by subtracting the market return from the ﬁrm daily return, (Rit − Rmt), and then averaged.7
Figure II shows that, no matter which measure of returns we focus on, mimicking the purchases
of insiders and independent directors generates substantial returns. The cumulative abnormal return
from buying a dollar worth of company stock at the same time as an oﬃcer does, and keeping the
position for 180 trading days, is on average 15 percent, while the raw return and BHAR are around
23 and 13 percent, respectively. Consistent with the hypothesis that the oﬃcers of the ﬁrm are more
informed about the current and future conditions of their company, they tend to perform better than
the independent directors. Nevertheless, the outside directors earn on average a substantial 10, 17
and 9 percent, depending on which measure of returns we focus on. The diﬀerence between the
two groups shrinks to zero once we look at median returns, indicating that a few very proﬁtable
transactions might aﬀect the averages. The level of the median returns is lower, but still positive and
substantial in most cases.8
6The regression analysis will control for size of the transaction, holdings of the company’s stock, and other charac-
teristics that might inﬂuence returns.
7The main diﬀerence between these measures of returns is that CARs ignore compounding, while raw returns and
BHARs account for it. Barber and Lyon (1997) provide a detailed description of the consequences of such diﬀerences.
They also describe various statistical diﬃculties that plague event studies at long horizons (1 to 5 years). Given our
shorter horizon, these problems are less likely to be relevant in our context. Nonetheless, the regression analysis will
help us make sure that our results are robust.
8Note that we don’t include transaction costs into the return calculations. This approach is common in the literature
10The graphs also show that these individuals have timing abilities and don’t just happen to be
trading at times in which the stock has been doing well for a while. If we plot the returns from
trading a little earlier than they do (20 trading days in the graphs), we can see that their returns
would have been much lower.
Further, we conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that these individuals are contrarians, who tend to buy after
price declines and sell after price increases (Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005)).
Figure III plots mean CARs, raw returns, and market-adjusted returns (BHARs) for sale transac-
tions. While the CARs indicate positive abnormal returns after sales, both the raw and the market
adjusted returns are negative or close to zero. The reason for this diﬀerence is likely to be related to
the well-known instability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc β
0s, which we used to compute the daily abnormal returns.
Interestingly, the diﬀerence in returns between outsiders and insiders are smaller (even though still
statistically signiﬁcant) in sales transactions. This is consistent with Seyhun (1992). The diﬀerent
results between sales and purchases has been interpreted in several ways. First, it is possible that
independent directors are more informed about bad news rather than good ones. Second, it is possible
that the scrutiny of selling activities of directors and insiders of the ﬁrm is more attentive when the
company is performing poorly. Finally, purchases may be more related to information, while sales
could be the result of portfolio rebalancing after stock grants and diversiﬁcation motives.
The ﬁnding that these individuals earn abnormal returns on their purchases and not on their
sales is consistent with most studies in the insider trading literature (Jaﬀe (1975), Seyhun (1986,
1992, 1998), Rozeﬀ and Zaman (1988), Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) among others). These
studies ﬁnd that insider trading forecasts future stock returns and that such predictability survives
after accounting for the return of the market, past stock returns, and ﬁrm size. One exception is
the study by Eckbo and Smith (1998), who, using Swedish data and various conditional performance
measures, ﬁnd evidence of zero or negative abnormal returns. More recently, Lakonishok and Lee
(2001) ﬁnd that, after accounting for size and book to market, insider buys lead to positive but
lower abnormal returns than previously estimated. They also ﬁnd that these individuals tend to
be more active in small value ﬁrms, that have historically performed well. To check whether this
tendency is driving our results, we will control for size and book to market in the regression analysis,
and show that the evidence of positive abnormal returns persists for both insiders and independent
directors. In addition, in Panel E and F of Table I, we report the results of breaking the sample into
5x5 size-B/M portfolios constructed using the breakpoints in Fama and French (1992). For each of
and, in this particular case, will not lead to a bias, as both insiders and outsiders face the same transaction costs. Also,
grants, option exercises, and stock aquired before the insider status was achieved make it impossible to determine the
exact holding periods for most of the transactions. For this reason, we cannot measure insiders’ information with the
actual returns they earn on their trades, but, like the rest of the literature, we rather focus on the returns earned at
various horizons by mimicking their trades.
11the 25 portfolios, we calculate the number of transactions and the average BHAR, broken down by
trader category. These individuals trade more in the lowest and highest quintiles of both size and
book to market. This dichotomy persists if we look at purchase transactions only, although there is
a slightly higher concentration in value ﬁrms. Sales tend to occur more in growth ﬁrms, especially
in the oﬃcers’ case. Panel E shows that purchase transactions are overall evenly distributed across
portfolios, although some patterns are identiﬁable. Oﬃcers tend to make more purchases in small
growth stocks, while independent directors make a bigger fraction of their purchases in very small
or very big ﬁrms within each B/M decile, and tend to trade more in small growth and value ﬁrms,
and in big value ﬁrms. As expected, the average market-adjusted returns are decreasing with size,
and increasing with BM, although not monotonically. Panel F contains similar data for sales, and
indicates that within each BM quintile the number of transactions increases with size, while within
each size quintile, transactions decrease with BM. An exception is the biggest size-BM quintile, where
there is a relatively big number of transactions. The trading returns decrease with BM and with size.
This evidence suggests that in our sample traders earn abnormal returns beyond those due to their
purchases of small value ﬁrms.
A concern is that some independent directors have relative big stakes in their company, and might
have diﬀerent incentives and access to information than the other directors. To check whether the
performance of such individuals drives the results, in Figure IV we compare the market-adjusted
returns earned by mimicking the trades of insiders and independent directors to those of large outside
blockholders sitting on the board. The rationale is that if the independent directors’ trading returns
are due to their high stakes, then the large blockholders should perform even better, or at least
similarly, since they have even higher stakes. The graphs suggest that this does not happen. Large
outside blockholders perform poorly relative to the other two groups of traders: the median returns
from purchase and sale transaction are signiﬁcantly lower than the independent directors, and the
same is true for average BHARs from sales, but not for purchases, possibly due to the eﬀect of some
big transaction. The results for this group of traders rely on limited data, and are therefore only
indicative.
The relatively good performance of the independent directors spurs the question of whether these
individuals are good on average, but less consistent in their performance than the oﬃcers. To check
whether this is the case, at each horizon we compared the cross sectional standard deviations of the
independent directors’ market adjusted returns to those of the executives (not reported). We ﬁnd that
they are indistinguishable. This result indicates that the outsiders not only enjoy returns that are
comparable to the insiders’, but also, taken as a group, are as consistent as the insiders in performing
well.
12Finally, in Figure V we check whether the trading returns are statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Since the residuals of a given ﬁrm may be correlated across transactions (time series dependence), we
clustered the standard errors to account for the dependence created by the ﬁrm eﬀect (see Petersen
(2006)). In the top panel of Figure V, we report the t statistics from the null hypothesis that the
market-adjusted returns earned by the insiders are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the various
horizons, while in the bottom panel we examine whether the insiders’ returns diﬀer from those of the
other two groups. The graphs provide strong evidence that insiders’ purchases earn market-adjusted
returns that are diﬀerent from 0 at the 95% conﬁdence level (the t- statistics range from 7 to 23). The
returns of the independent directors are high, but statistically lower than the insiders’ (t-statistics
between 3 and 7). When we examine sale transactions we ﬁnd the opposite result. Both the executives
of the ﬁrms and independent directors have market adjusted returns that are not statistically diﬀerent
from 0. We also report the t-statistics for large outside blockholders sitting on the board, but we
don’t have enough statistical power to reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence with the insiders’
returns. The t-statistics for CARs and raw returns (not reported) yield similar results.
The results above support the view of part of the insider trading literature that executives make
positive returns when buying the company stock. They also augment this result with a new ﬁnding:
independent directors without large stakes in the company also do substantially better than the
market when they buy the company stock.
Although suggestive, the event study results alone are unconvincing. Many issues remain open,
including a selection bias related to diﬀerent fractions of independent directors and diﬀerent stock
ownership levels across ﬁrms, and the eﬀect on returns of transaction size and stock holdings, ﬁrm
characteristics, governance quality, and institutional arrangements. For this reason, in the remaining
part of the paper we repeat the same analysis using regressions, and adding ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. If
there are some omitted ﬁrm characteristics that drive both the choice of directors and their ability
to collect information, the event study results could be entirely explained by the ﬁrm selection. It
is also possible that ﬁrms that experience more outsider trades have characteristics that would lead
to higher average returns irrespective of whom is trading. Finally, most ﬁrms have company-speciﬁc
blackout periods, and if the relative fraction of independent directors and insiders in the board is
correlated with these governance characteristics, it is possible that our results are due to ﬁrm-level
governance rules. Adding ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects to the regressions will account for any time-invariant
diﬀerence across ﬁrms, and will provide a comparison of insiders and outsiders belonging to the same
ﬁrm and facing the same institutional environment.
In the regressions, we focus on market-adjusted returns, to control for changes in business con-
ditions and make sure that positive returns do not simply follow from more trading activity during
13economic booms. As before, we analyze purchases and sales separately. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns of Ta-
ble 2 Panel A present the results of a regression where the dependent variable is the market adjusted
return of holding the individual long position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180 trading days, respectively.9 All
the regressions include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and cluster the standard errors at the individual level. Pur-
chases are more information-driven and will therefore be the main focus of the analysis. The constant
measures the market-adjusted return the company oﬃcers. Consistent with the view that insiders
proﬁt on information related to the long term prospects of the ﬁrm, rather than short term tangible
information, we ﬁnd that returns increase with the horizon (Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003)). On
average, mimicking the insiders’ buys yields a 12% market-adjusted return in 180 days.10 This eﬀect
is highly statistically signiﬁcant, and it conﬁrms that insiders earn higher returns than the market,
even after accounting for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Similarly, mimicking the buys of the indepen-
dent directors yields a 10% market-adjusted return over the same horizon. This ﬁnding indicates that
the high returns associated to the independent directors in the event study are not due to a selection
bias at the ﬁrm level, since, after accounting for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the diﬀerence with the insiders’
returns is even lower, although it remains statistically signiﬁcant.
On average, the outsiders make larger transactions than the insiders. If bigger transactions gener-
ate an incentive to trade better, then the diﬀerence in mean returns between these two groups could
be biased downward. To make sure that this is not the case, in the last 5 columns of Panel A we
control for transaction size and stock holdings, and look at the interaction between these variables
and the identity of the individual trading. We ﬁnd that adding these controls to the regressions
does not change the results. Mimicking the insiders’ trades generates a statistically signiﬁcant 15%
market-adjusted return, while the diﬀerence between insiders and outsiders is unchanged and equal
to 2.5%. In general, transaction size does not aﬀect returns, except at the longer horizon where,
all else equal, an increase in the amount traded signiﬁcantly reduces returns, possibly due to price
pressure. In particular, an increase of $10,000 in the size of the transaction leads to a drop in the
return of 2.882%. To interpret this magnitude, notice that the mean transaction size is $72,731,
while the median one is $8,712. On the contrary, holdings size signiﬁcantly reduces returns at all
horizons, although this eﬀect is not economically signiﬁcant. An increase of $10M in stock holdings
is associated with a decrease in returns of only 0.33%. Recall the average stock holdings is $12.2M,
while the median holdings are $360,028. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that independent directors who have
9For comparison, Figures II and III plot the coeﬃcients of a regression of the return on a indicator variable equal
to one if the trader is an executive of the ﬁrm, and zero otherwise; an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
director is independent, but not a large blockholder and zero otherwise; and an indicator variable if the director is a
large blockholder and also an independent director, and zero otherwise.
10This horizon is interesting because Rule 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires these individuals
to surrender any proﬁt made on transactions that are oﬀset within six months.
14larger holdings in the ﬁrm do slightly better than independent directors with smaller holdings (0.27%
more at the longer horizon). This result is consistent with a story that insiders get information due
to their role, while outsiders need to exert eﬀort to get information. The higher the incentives to ﬁnd
out information, the more the independent director will try to acquire it.
The coeﬃcient of large outside blockholders indicates that the high returns of independent di-
rectors are not due to large stock holdings and are not biased upward by potential misclassiﬁcation
of large blockholders into the independent director category. The diﬀerence between insiders and
large outside blockholders is bigger than the one between insiders and independent directors at most
horizon, although not statistically signiﬁcant due to the few observations available for this group.
The regressions that control for transaction size and stock holdings are also reassuring that the
skewness of such variables does not unduly aﬀect the results. As a further check (not reported) we also
repeat the regressions after trimming the sample of the top 1 percent for transaction size and stock
holdings in each of the trader categories. We ﬁnd that the results are not aﬀected by this change.
In Panel B we re-run the same regression for sale transactions. Consistent with the ﬁndings of the
insider trading literature, insiders do not earn higher abnormal returns on sales. Indeed, the diﬀerence
between insiders and outsiders’ returns for sales is of the same magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance
as for purchases, but since the insiders do not make higher returns, the independent directors make
negative returns. In the last 5 columns of Table 2, Panel B we control for the size of the transaction
and of the holdings. These controls do not modify our previous ﬁndings.
IV Robustness Checks
A natural question that arises when looking at our ﬁndings is whether the individuals categorized by
the governance rules as independent are truly such. To investigate this issue, we exploit a stricter
deﬁnition of independence proposed in the Higgs report for the UK. Accordingly, we deﬁne as strictly
independent directors who are outsiders and not former employees, nor employees of an organization
to which the ﬁrm gives charity contributions. In addition, for a director to be deﬁned as strictly
independent, the Higgs report also requires that she or he does not have any business transaction
with the company, does not give the company any professional service, and is not a relative of any
oﬃcer. Finally, a strictly independent director does not have interlocking directorship with one of the
executives, and does not have any other aﬃliation with the company.11 The information to implement
11According to the Sarbanes Oxley Act, a director is independent if she is ”not receiving, other than for service on
the board, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer, and [is not] an aﬃliated person of the
issuer, or any subsidiary thereof”. The Higgs Report proposes to deﬁne as independent those directors that have ”no
material business relationship” with the company.
15such deﬁnition comes from IRRC and is available only for a subset of the transactions, and only for
the period between 1996 and 2003. In this subsample there are 4,190,880 observations, corresponding
to 22.28% of the original dataset. The data cover 15,645 individual-company-year combinations, 1,739
Firms, 22,336 individuals, and 117,626 trades. Of the 891,600 observations regarding the outsiders,
629,680 (70.62%) satisfy the deﬁnition of strict independence.12 This fraction increases slightly over
the period. Compared to the other outsiders, on average the strictly independent directors make
smaller transactions, own less of the company stock, have a much shorter tenure (10 versus 15 years),
and are more likely to sit on the audit and compensation committees (45.22% chance versus 23.47%,
and 43.68% chance versus 19.81%, respectively). Also, the ﬁrms in which these individuals trade are
bigger and have a higher market to book ratio than those in the original dataset.
Table 3 shows that using this deﬁnition of independence does not change substantially our results.
The averageBHAR associated with oﬃcers’ purchases is 12.24%, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The
trading performance associated to the strictly independent directors is statistically indistinguishable
from the that of the insiders: in purchase transactions (Table 3, Panel A), both insiders and strictly
independent directors outperform the market; while in sale transactions both insiders and strictly
independent directors earn negative abnormal returns (Table 3, Panel B). Although these diﬀerences
are not statistically signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients indicates that the strictly independent
directors underperform the executives by 4.44 percentage points, while the other outsiders do better
than the insiders. In the next section we will show that this diﬀerence is not always big and negative,
but it rather depends on the committees the director sits on. This evidence and that in the next
section suggest that independent directors know less than the insiders, but in some cases, depending
on which committee they sit, they do have the means to get information about the ﬁrm, even when
they don’t have any material link with the company except their directorship.
In Table 4, we examine the eﬀect of ﬁrm size and market to book ratio on the insiders’ returns.
The more recent insider trading literature has argued whether the abnormal returns obtained by
imitating these individuals are robust to controlling for trading strategies that exploit the size and
book to market risk factors. Panel E and F of Table 1 conﬁrm that both executives and independent
directors trade more in smaller, high book to market ﬁrms, which have performed well in the past.
In Panel A of Table 4 we re-run the regressions reported in Table 2, controlling for ﬁrm size and
book to market. Our ﬁndings are robust to such controls. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Eckbo and
Smith (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005), accounting for size and book to market
decreases the average returns earned by mimicking the company’s executives. However, such returns
are still positive, and highly statistically signiﬁcant. From the coeﬃcients in Panel A we can see that
12This number corresponds to 15.03% of all the observations.
16in a ﬁrm with the average size and book to market ratio the insiders’ average (median) abnormal
return from purchase transactions is 8.72% (5.12%), signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Also, the
diﬀerence between independent directors and insiders does not change after controlling for ﬁrm size
and BM. Panel B reports the results for sales transactions and conﬁrms that on average executives
lose money when they sell the company stock, and more so do the independent directors. Consistent
with the previous literature, they lose less money when they sell stock in large growth ﬁrms. On
average though, the return from trading in a ﬁrm with the average size and book to market ratio is
-7.56%, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
One other concern is that these individuals make higher returns than the market because they
trade in riskier companies. The previous analysis already partly accounts for this concern by analyzing
cumulative abnormal returns, and by controlling for the size and book to market risk factors. If
executives and directors trade more in companies that have high beta, then the CARs, which control
for past β, should pick this eﬀect up. Also, to the extent that ﬁrm size and book to market proxy
for some systematic risk factors diﬀerent than the market, the regressions reported in Table 4 show
that our ﬁndings are robust to accounting for such systematic risk. In Table 5 we further examine
this issue from a somewhat diﬀerent angle, and re-run the analysis on sub-samples that constitute the
quartiles of total ﬁrm return volatility, measured on the interval going from -360 to -20 trading days
before the transaction. This variable captures both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. One caveat
about this analysis is that if these individuals have superior information about the company what
it appears to be volatility and risk for an uninformed investor is not necessarily so for the insider.
Thus, we should intepret the results keeping in mind that past return volatility might not be a proper
measure of the perceived and the actual risk these traders are facing.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for purchases and shows that the return of the insiders
increase with the volatility of stock returns. The diﬀerence between the executives and outside
directors increases with risk across the subsamples, although not monotonically. It is the lowest in
the third volatility quartile, where it is equal to 0.33% and is not statistically signiﬁcant, and the
highest in the fourth quartile, where it is equal to 4.91%, and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Overall, independent directors do not underperform the executives in most of their trades, except for
companies that have experienced a high amount of volatility in the previous year (fourth quartile).
For such ﬁrms the returns enjoyed by mimicking the executives’ trades are quite high, 31.78% on
average, and statistically signiﬁcant. The return of independent directors trading in the same type
of ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly lower, although still substantial, 26.87% on average. The returns from sales
are reported in Panel B and are not economically diﬀerent from zero for all the quartiles.
17V The Eﬀect of Governance and Institutional Settings
In this section we investigate in more detail the mechanisms through which the independent directors
can acquire information. We start by examining the eﬀect of governance quality on trading per-
formance and on the diﬀerences between insiders and outsiders. To do so, we employ the index of
governance quality proposed in Gompers et al. (2003). Next, we analyze the eﬀect of various internal
governance mechanisms on the diﬀerence between insiders and outsiders within a given ﬁrm. In par-
ticular, we check whether the information that independent directors have about the ﬁrm depends on
the committees they sit on, the presence of institutional investors, and other features of the corporate
boards that have been shown by previous studies to matter for monitoring eﬀectiveness, such as board
size and directors attendance. The results are reported below.
A Are Independent Directors better informed in better governed ﬁrms?
In Table 6 we investigate whether the governance characteristics of the ﬁrm impact the ability of
insiders and independent board members to make proﬁts on their purchases and sale transactions.
To characterize the governance of the company we use the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003)
which measures shareholders rights by counting the number of governance provisions a ﬁrm has. More
governance provisions indicate more restricted shareholder rights. Gompers et al. (2003) provide
empirical evidence that cross-sectionally, ﬁrm value is higher when shareholder rights are stronger
(i.e., when the G Index is lower). Following their approach, we classify companies into 10 groups, or
deciles: those with a governance index less or equal than 5, equal to 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and
greater or equal than 14.
In Panel A of Table 6 we run the base regressions controlling for governance decile and ﬁnd that
both insiders and outsiders earn signiﬁcantly higher returns than the market, for almost all levels
of the governance index. At the mean governance index, equal to 9, the insiders’ market-adjusted
return is 15.20%, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, while in most of the other deciles it is slightly
above 10%. Exceptions are the better governed ﬁrms, where the executives’ returns are low and
indistinguishable from zero, and the worse governed ﬁrms where they make very high returns. This
result is striking because on average ﬁrms with worse governance have lower returns than otherwise
similar ﬁrms (Gompers et al., 2003). Robustness checks that trim or winsorize outliers conﬁrm this
ﬁnding. One possible interpretation is that in better governed ﬁrms both executives and independent
directors may feel more restrained from trading on private information. As a consequence, they would
make less money compared to the market (Giannetti and Simonov, 2005). Alternatively, our results
are also consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms with better governance structure might have better
18mechanisms in place that allow the market to receive more information.
The average diﬀerence between outsiders and executives of the ﬁrm is 2.33%, the same as in
the previous regressions, and it is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Given that better governed
ﬁrms are more transparent, and have better developed mechanisms to transmit information to the
board, we would expect that, all else equal, independent directors have more information and make
higher returns in better governed ﬁrms. The interaction term between the bad governance ﬁrms and
independent directors addresses such question. As expected, this coeﬃcient has the negative sign, as
worse governance negatively aﬀects the information an outsider can acquire. However, it is neither
economically nor statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that outsiders do not have an informational
disadvantage in worse governed ﬁrms. The result is stronger when we focus on strictly independent
directors, who supposedly rely more on board meetings and formalized communication channels to get
information about the ﬁrm. Consistent with our intuition, we ﬁnd that strictly independent directors
earn, all else equal, higher returns when trading in better governed ﬁrms. These results are reported
in Panel A2.
In Panel B we repeat the same regression for sale transactions. Conﬁrming our previous
ﬁndings, all the individuals do worse than the market when selling the company stock, but this
diﬀerence monotonically decreases as the governance index gets worse, ﬂipping sign at the median
governance index (governance index equal to 10). Controlling for whether the outside directors are
stricly independent leads to the same results (Panel B2).
To conclude, the quality of the ﬁrm’s governance doesn’t aﬀect our ﬁnding that insiders and inde-
pendent directors make positive abnormal returns when purchasing the company stock. Interestingly,
this is more true for ﬁrms with worse governance, possibly due to lack of transparency and more
possibilities to exploit inside information. Also, outside directors as a group do not do signiﬁcantly
better in better governed ﬁrms, but strictly independent directors do.
B Does Committee Membership Matter for the Acquisition of Informa-
tion?
In this section we examine how the individuals on the board acquire information about the ﬁrm. In
particular, we check how much information outside directors obtain through their committee work
and attendance to board meetings, as opposed to informal channels and personal contact with the
management, or independent research and prior knowledge of similar companies.
We have committee membership data only for a subsample, which is described in Section 2.1.
The committees analyzed are the audit committee, the compensation, the nominating, the corporate
19governance, and the executive committee. The audit committee nominates the external auditor,
and ensures that the ﬁnancial statements are accurate, complete and reliable. The compensation
committee reviews the compensation package of the CEO and the other oﬃcers. The nominating
committee oversees the size and composition of the board, and proposes the new board members
to be elected. The corporate governance committee oversees governance practises and establishes
criteria to evaluate the board members and the oﬃcers. Finally, the executive committee acts on
behalf of the full board outside meeting times, and has responsibilities and powers that vary across
ﬁrms. Adams (2003) provides a more detailed description of the characteristics of each committee,
and indicates that all of them have a monitoring role as their main duty, with the exception of the
executive committee that has a strategic role as well.
Panels A and B of Table 7 show the eﬀect of adding committee membership to the base regressions.
Our previous ﬁndings about the levels and diﬀerence in the trading performance of insiders and inde-
pendent directors are conﬁrmed. Panel A also shows that the people sitting on the compensation and
nominating committees have, all else equal, higher returns, although not always statistically signiﬁ-
cant.13 Since belonging to the audit committee implies better knowledge of the ﬁnancial statements
of the ﬁrm, we would expect that the people sitting on it have a better trading performance than the
others, if trading performance reﬂects information at all. Surprisingly, the market-adjusted return of
the members of the audit committee is -0.64% at the 180 days horizon, and statistically indistinguish-
able from zero. However, the people that should beneﬁt the most from sitting on a committee are the
stricltly independent directors, as the insiders get information from working in the company itself,
or through informal channels, in virtue of their close relation to the oﬃcers. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction of audit committee membership and strict independence conﬁrms this conjecture. Strictly
independent directors beneﬁt from sitting on the audit committee, and earn an additional return of
3.21%. Such diﬀerence and the strictly independent dummy are jointly statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level. Similarly, strictly independent directors sitting on the governance committee also
generate positive market-adjusted returns. On the contrary, the compensation and executive com-
mittees are associated with slightly negative returns for strictly independent directors, while the rest
of the committees do not display an economically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between insiders and outsiders
within the committee.14
There are many reasons why certain committees are associated with higher average returns, and,
more generally, independent directors earn positive abnormal returns. One reason is that their duties
13As usual, to make sure that any diﬀerence in the ﬁndings is due to the additional regressors, rather than the
diﬀerent sample, we have re-run the base regressions on this subsample (not reported). We have found that the results
are the same as those in Table 2.
14Similar regressions that include interactions between committee membership and outsider status (not reported)
yield similar, but statistically non signiﬁcant results.
20involve the acquisition of diﬀerent types and degrees of information, which the directors can then use
in their trading. An alternative explanation is that the insiders give trading tips to the indipendent
directors to bribe them. Distinguishing between these two conﬂicting hypotheses is very hard. Nev-
ertheless, if the insiders reward directors by providing them with more/less inside information, we
would expect that the best performing independent directors are those sitting on the compensation
and nominating committee. On the contrary, if independent director acquire information about the
ﬁrm irrespective of whether it is good or bad for the insiders, audit committee members, who have a
better knowledge of the ﬁnancial statements, should enjoy higher returns. The evidence in Panel A
suggests that, on average, the ”informed director” explanation is more likely than the ”bribed direc-
tor” one. Another way to shed light on the issue is to see whether directors that have been on the
board longer and are more entrenched with the management earn higher returns. Results available
upon request again indicate that this is not the case. The coeﬃcients on tenure and the interaction
of tenure and strict independence are economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
On a diﬀerent note, analyzing the trading performance of people on diﬀerent committees leads to
a selection issue. If individuals that are better at trading, or have more information, are more likely
to be elected to certain committees, then their superior trading performance is erroneously attributed
to taking part to the activities of a given committee, rather than to individual ability. The ideal
way to address this issue would be to add individual ﬁxed eﬀects to the regressions, on top of the
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Unfortunately, this proves a very hard task from the econometric point of view,
since diﬀerent individuals within a ﬁrm join and leave the ﬁrm at diﬀerent times and move to and
from diﬀerent ﬁrms.15 However, that to the extent that we control for individual status, committee
membership, and the interaction of the two, in order to tell the story that independent directors do
better when sitting on the audit committee just because they are better at trading we would need
that the smartest outsiders and the dumbest insiders be put on the audit committee. In addition,
if trading skills were the only reason for the diﬀerences we should see that attending the meetings
regularly does not have any eﬀect on trading performance. On the contrary, Table 10 shows that
outsiders that attend less than 75% of the meetings earn signiﬁcantly lower returns.
These ﬁndings provide suggestive evidence that independent directors possess information about
the current and future conditions of their company. Consistent with our intuition, committee mem-
bership and attendance are important means of information acquisition for the strictly independent
directors, who might have less access to informal communication channels and do not work day by
15The results are heavily dependent on whether the ﬁrm or the individual ﬁxed eﬀect is estimated ﬁrst. See Abowd
et al. (1999) for a structural framework that addresses this issue for a special case in the context of ﬁrm and individual
level heterogeneity in labor markets.
21day in the ﬁrm.
C Eﬀect of Board Size on Trading Returns
The empirical corporate governance literature stresses the importance of board size for the monitoring
abilities of directors and ﬁrm performance. Large boards do not function properly because of free
riding issues, diseconomies of scales, and lack of decisiveness. Kaplan and Gertner (1996) analyze
a sample of reversed LBOs ﬁrms, whose boards are expected to be value maximizing, and ﬁnd that
such boards are smaller, own a larger equity stake, and meet less often. Yermack (1996) shows that
ﬁrms with smaller boards have higher valuations and better ﬁnancial ratios, and that they provide
more performance related incentives to the top oﬃcers.
In this section, we investigate whether board size aﬀects the return from mimicking the trades of
insiders and independent directors. Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for purchase transactions.
The market-adjusted return is regressed on an outsider dummy and a large outside blockholder
dummy, the natural logarithm of board size, and interaction terms between board size and the
individual’s role in the ﬁrm. The table shows that in a ﬁrm with the average board size, equal to 10
members, the executives’ average market-adjusted return is 10.99%, signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
In this subsample, the diﬀerence between executives and independent directors is quite substantial,
5.8%, and statistically signiﬁcant. To check whether this is due to controlling for board size, rather
than a feature of the subsample itself, we performed the same base regressions as in Table 2 on
this subsample and conﬁrmed that the diﬀerence between insiders and outsiders is a feature of the
sample.16 Consistent with previous studies, a bigger board is associated with lower returns, even
after controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. An increase in one standard deviation in the board size of a
given ﬁrm generates a drop in returns of 12%. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that in bigger boards outside
directors earn signiﬁcantly higher returns, that are comparable to the insiders’. There can be many
reasons for this ﬁnding. It is possible that in a larger board there are more independent directors and
that this makes it easier for them to acquire information. Many studies underscore the importance
of the fraction of independent directors for monitoring of the management. Hermalin and Weisbach
(2001) survey the literature on the role and eﬀects of boards of directors, and document that the
fraction of outsiders on the board is not correlated with ﬁrm performance, but boards with more
outsiders tend to make better decisions in CEO compensation and replacement, and takeovers (see,
for example, Weisbach (1988), and Dahya and McConnell (2001)). Morck (2004) and Adams et al.
(2005) investigate the eﬀect of board composition on its eﬀectiveness and illustrate how the identity of
the members and the balance between insiders and independent directors is an important determinant
16Such diﬀerence is 4.28% when no controls for board size are included in the regressions.
22of board eﬀectiveness. Given these ﬁndings we looked at the proportion of independent directors in
ﬁrms in diﬀerent quartiles of board size and found that there are more independent directors in ﬁrms
with bigger boards. We plan to investigate more about this issue in a future version of the paper.
D Controlling for Alternative Governance Mechanisms: the Presence of
Institutional Investors
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a model where the presence of one or more large shareholders
provides discipline to the management. Many studies have provided empirical support to such view.
Firms with large minority shareholders are more likely to replace the management (Kaplan and
Minton, (1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1995)), or to facilitate takeovers (Shivdasani (1993)), if the
ﬁrm performs poorly. A large shareholder can provide a powerful governance mechanism to keep the
management in check, and its role can be complementary to that of the board of directors, although
its objectives and interests may not be in line with those of the shareholders at large. Recently, some
institutional investors have taken a more active role in the companies they invest in, and have in some
cases publicly asked for major changes that increase shareholders value (see, for example, CalPERS).
This trend can facilitate the job of independent directors in acquiring information and monitoring
the management, but can also make it redudant, or create a free rider problem.
In this section we investigate the eﬀect that a large presence of institutional investors in the
company has on the information that independent directors are able to acquire. Table 9 shows that,
all else equal, insiders earn lower returns in companies where a large fraction of the shares are held by
institutional investors. This result, seen in conjuction with the ﬁnding of Gompers and Metrick (2001)
that institutional ownership is associated with higher future returns, can be interpreted in two ways.
One possibility is that the presence of institutional investors makes the executives more reluctant to
trade on their superior information. Alternatively, large institutional investors might make it easier
for the market to acquire timely information about the company, thus reducing the informational
advantage of the ﬁrm’s oﬃcers. The presence of institutional investors does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
diﬀerence between insiders and independent directors. Independent directors tend to do worse than
the insiders, although such diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, strictly independent
directors do on average as well as the insiders, with the exception of ﬁrms with high institutional
holdings, where they perform 9.37% less than the executives.
In sales transactions, the returns of both executives and directors are not statistically nor eco-
nomically diﬀerent than zero.
23VI Insider and Outsider Trading and Earning Restatements
One concern about our ﬁndings is that independent directors might be overall well informed, but only
when the oﬃcers want so, and might lack access to information exactly at those times when it is crucial
for monitoring purposes to have it. To further investigate this issue we analyze a subsample of ﬁrm
that between January 1997 and June 2002 restated their earnings due to accounting irregularities.
This sample has been collected by the U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) and is described in
detail in Section 2.1.
The insider trading literature documents that insiders are aware of whether the earnings will be
restated well in advance of the restatement. Baneish (1999) shows that insiders sales are abnormally
higher after earning announcements that end up being restated later in the future. Our question is
whether there is any diﬀerence in the behavior of oﬃcers and independent directors in ﬁrms that
experience earning restatements.
To address this question, we estimate whether the probability of sale and purchase transactions
before and after a restatement diﬀers across category of traders. If an individual is aware that the
earnings posted by the company are not accurate she should be more likely than an uninformed
trader to sell before rather than after the earning restatement. Table 11 reports the results of such
analysis. Column 1 shows that independent directors are more likely than the insiders to sell after
an earning restatement has been announced. Such marginal eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant, but it is
very small. The table also shows that independent directors are slightly more likely than the insiders
to purchase before a restatement and slightly less likely to sell before such announcement (columns
3 and 5, respectively). None of the eﬀect is economically nor statistically signiﬁcant. Despite there
are few observations, the results are consistent with the theory that insiders are marginally more
informed than outsiders, although the diﬀerence is very small. Since not all restatements are equal,
in Columns 2, 4 and 6 we repeat the same analysis controlling for whether the restatatement is due to
revenue recognition, which has been proven to generate the most negative market reaction (Anderson
and Lombardi Yohn (2002)). It also controls for whether the restatement has been prompted by an
entity outside the ﬁrm (usually the SEC, the FASB, or the auditor), and for interaction terms that
check whether these features have a diﬀerential impact on the outsiders. The coeﬃcients have the
expected sign, but are neither economically nor statistically signiﬁcant. This lack of signiﬁcance could
be due to the few observations available, or to the fact that the window analyzed, the 80 trading
days around the restatement announcement, is relatively short and most of the transactions that
exploit such information have been already executed. Thus, we investigate whether the marginally
higher information that insiders enjoy is impounded in their trading returns, and whether analyzing
24only a window of time around the restatements has an eﬀect. For this purpose, we repeat the base
regressions presented in Table 2 on the subsample of transactions made in the 80 trading days window
analyzed above (reported in Table 11), and on the subsample of transactions made in these companies
irrespective of the date of the transaction (reported in Table 12).
Panel A of Table 11 shows that the independent directors earn signiﬁcantly higher returns than
the insiders when they buy the company stock in the window around a restatement announcement.
The insiders make average negative abnormal returns equal to 5.03%, while the outsiders make 7.83%
more. Both returns are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. Panel B suggests that such diﬀerence is due
to restatements associated to revenue recognition: the insiders lose 6.65%, while the outsiders make
6.46% in such cases, as opposed to losing 2.16% and 0.6%, respectively, in the other restatement cases.
Panel B also shows that while it does not matter for the insiders’ returns whether the restatement
has been prompted internally or from an external source, the independent directors make 2.07% less
when the prompter is external. This ﬁnding is consistent with a story where the independent directors
monitor the executives and in the process learn information that leads to the restatement, but also
helps them trade well. At the same time, the insiders trade less and at worse terms for fear to be
accused of insider trading once the restatement announcement is made. These ﬁndings are however
only indicative and other stories could be consistent with them. None of the coeﬃcient is by itself
statistically signiﬁcant. To investigate whether this might be due to the high collinearity induced by
the interaction terms, we test the joint signiﬁcance of the outsider dummy, the revenue recognition
and the interaction and ﬁnd that they signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero at the 99 percent conﬁdence
level. Panel C and D show that both insiders and outsiders lose money when they sell the company
stock and that this is especially true for the revenue recognition cases.
In Table 12 we repeat the regressions on this subsample to check for all the transactions involving
the ﬁrms that undergo a restatement, irrespective of when they are executed. The rationale is that
there can be a big lag between the time the earnings are announced and the time they are restated.
Individuals with superior information about the accuracy of the earning announcement can exploit it
at any time between these two events. Panel A shows that the market-adjusted returns associated to
the insiders trades are positive and high, and indistinguishable from those associated to the outsiders’
trades. The executives returns are higher than the average returns found in the larger sample of ﬁrms
we analyze. On the contrary, large outside blockholders sitting on the board make huge negative
losses when buying stocks in these subset of ﬁrms. The results are robust to controlling for the reason
and the prompter of the restatement (Panel B). The coeﬃcients for the sales transactions (Panels C
and D) tell a similar story.
The evidence reported in Tables 11 and 12 suggests that outsiders are informed about the company,
25even when things are not going well and it is not in the interest of the oﬃcers to give them information.
It also show that insiders trade on longer term information than the outsiders and that they exploit
the information about the accuracy of the earnings statements earlier than the outsiders and well in
advance of the restatement.
VII Future Extensions
In future versions of the paper we would like to investigate further some issues we have touched upon
in this version.
One of them is the eﬀect of diﬀerent benchmark returns on our results. In the analyses conducted
so far we have used the value weighted market return as the reference point to which we have compared
the individuals returns. In the event study we have also accounted for the sensitivity of the stock
returns to the market returns by calculating the beta of the stock and the CARs. In addition, the
regressions in Table 4 control for the eﬀect of ﬁrm size and book to market, which have been shown
by the work of Fama and French to aﬀect stock returns, while the regressions in Table 5 account
fro idiosyncratic risk as well. The results are not aﬀected by these diﬀerent way of measuring risk.
Nevertheless, we plan to use a characteristics approach similar to that in Daniel and Titman (1997)
as a further check on our ﬁndings.
Another interesting extension involves a more detailed study of the selection issue and the time in
which insiders and outsiders trade. To the extent that people trade only when they have proﬁtable
information it is possible that we ﬁnd sizeable returns for the independent directors even though they
don’t have information at all times and maybe at those times in which monitoring is more crucial.
Dealing with this issue involves checking what is the probability that an outsider trades given that an
insides had done so. At the moment, we have some evidence, from Figure I, that the outsiders’ trades
seem actually more spread across the year than the insiders’. This evidence points to the fact that
outsiders as a group seem to have valuable information and trade often. These suggestive ﬁndings
need to be corroborated by a statistical analysis that examines if this is the case within each ﬁrm, or
what are the types of ﬁrms for which this happens.
Other extensions involve a further analysis of whether the independent directors have information
that is helpful for monitoring or receive only the information that the insiders want them to receive.
The evidence from the earning restatement analysis suggests that this not the case. The regressions
on committee membership provide further support to this view, as the independent directors are
shown to have information when sitting on the audit rather than the compensation committee. The
analysis of the eﬀect of tenure and whether the director has been elected under the current CEO or
26one of her predecessors is a venue of future research.
Last but not least, it would be very interesting to see how things have changed after the introduc-
tion of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in August of 2002. As time passes more data become available and
it will soon be possible to investigate the eﬀect of the new regulations, the heightened attention paid
by the markets to the quality of the corporate governance of the ﬁrm, and the change in perception
after the scandals of the start of the decade.
VIII Conclusions
This paper investigates the information available to outsiders on the board of directors in order to
shed light on their monitoring ability. By analyzing the open market sales and purchases of a sample
of U.S. oﬃcers and outside directors we reach preliminary ﬁndings indicating that these individuals
earn positive market adjusted returns when purchasing the company stock. The results are robust to
controlling for the size of the transaction and the stock holdings, and to various proxies of risk, such as
ﬁrm size, book to market and past return volatility. We also analyzed the eﬀect of governance quality
on trading returns and found that both insiders and independent directors make higher returns in ﬁrms
with the worst governance and that in this case the diﬀerence between insiders and outsiders widens.
The results on committee membership and attendance indicate that sitting on the audit committee
and, attending the meetings regularly, is beneﬁcial for the independent directors. As expected, these
variables have no eﬀect on the performance of the oﬃcers, since they cquire the information about
the company every day on their jobs.
Future extensions involve analyzing the impact of Sarbanes Oxley, and to further investigate
the times and conditions when the diﬀerence between the independent directors and the executives
widens.
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31Table 1:
Summary Statistics: transactions and ﬁrms
characteristics
The data comes from the TFN Insider Filing Data Files. For each insiders that ﬁles information with SEC we have
the name and various positions the insider holds in the ﬁrm (i.e. President, VP, large blockholder). The data reports
the date of the transaction, number of shares bought/sold, and price paid/received. We restrict our sample on the
trades made by individuals who hold a position in the board and distinguish among three diﬀerent types: (i) executives
of the ﬁrm, (ii) non executive directors who are large blockholders (own more than 10% of the company stock), and (iii)
directors who are neither employees of the ﬁrm, nor large blockholders (outside or independent directors). We exclude
utilities and ﬁnancial companies, which are subject to speciﬁc regulations, and also ﬁrms for which less than 200 daily
returns are available in CRSP prior to the transaction date. Panel A contains sample statistics for the whole sample of
transactions. Panel B only contains sample statistics on the sub-sample of transactions made by individuals of ﬁrms
for which we have information about the size of the board. Panel C contains sample statistics on the subsample of
transactions by individuals for whom we have also information on which committee they are appointed. Finally, Panel
D contains sample statistics for the sub-sample of transactions made by individuals (executives or directors) of ﬁrms
that have restated earnings during the sample period.
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Panel A: Whole sample 
Transaction Characteristics 
  Percentages Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Purchases          
% purchases:          
Insiders 15.63%       82,503 
Outsiders 16.78%       88,617 
Large outside blockholders  1.96%       10,353 
Value          
Insiders    $72,731 $8,712  $1,133,121  81,862 
Outsiders    $184,054 $13,380  $10,300,000  88,050 
Large outside blockholders  $223,015 $12,500 $3,657,372  10,262 
Sales          
% sales:          
Insiders 42.21%       222,846 
Outsiders 20.38%       107,594 
Large outside blockholders  3.05%       16,086 
Value:          
Insiders    $456,602 $94,200 $5,489,410  222,372 
Outsiders    $800,165 $85,500  $10,500,000  107,225 
Large outside blockholders  $2,121,411 $121,300 $29,600,000  16,067 
Holdings        
\# of shares:        
Insiders    450,236 22,554 4,261,338  94,792 
Outsiders    592,377 25,375 4,638,740  52,729 
Large outside blockholders    2,984,694  982,704  15,900,000  8,360 
Value:   
Insiders  $12,200,000 $360,028  $320,000,000  94,768 
Outsiders  $12,000,000 $283,774  $153,000,000  52,710 
Large outside blockholders    $71,000,000 $6,407,808  $501,000,000  8,354 
Firm Characteristics 
   Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Governance Index    8.907  9  2.585  6071680 
Size    5.501519 5.434447  2.060054  17211242 
Book to Market Value    0.4978097 0.3549539  0.5081673  16632865 
Total Return Volatility     0.0399241 0.0348283  0.0229786  21017498 
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Panel B: Subsample for which we have individual participation to committees 
Individual Characteristics 
  Percentage Mean Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Audit Committee  13.30%        49457 
Compensation Committee  12.47%        49488 
Nominating Committee  7.82%        49465 
Corporate Gov. Committee 3.37%        49483 
Executive Committee  6.84%        49483 
Former Employee   8.53%        15645 
Charity 0.09%        15645 
Business Transaction  2.69%        15645 
Relative 2.18%        15645 
Interlocking directorship  0.92%        15645 
Other Affiliation  0.09%        15645 
Compensation for Prof. Svcs  6.62%        15645 
Truly indep  15.03%       1,143,880 
Attendance 1.62%        15645 
Designated Director 1.55%       15645 
Age   57.505  58.000  9.311222  15645 
Year Service Began    1990  1993  8.999853  12413 
Year Service Ended    2001  2001  1.572333  12415 
Tenure     10.93975  8  8.970655  12399 
Institutional Holdings (%)    58.76066 62.1  22.33849  7967 
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Panel B (cont.): Subsample for which we have individual participation to committees 
Transaction Characteristics 
  Percentage Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Purchases          
% purchases:          
Insiders 50.68%       13,098 
Outsiders 46.55%        12,032 
Large outside 
blockholders  2.77%       717 
Value:          
Insiders   $142,136  $19,965  $1,470,859  13,079 
Outsiders   $399,837  $26,625  $6,916,806  12,017 
Large outside 
blockholders   $958,232  $76,200  $6,242,051  713 
          
Sales          
% sales:          
Insiders 69.60%       63,879 
Outsiders 25.18%        23,112 
Large outside 
blockholders  5.22%       4,788 
Value:          
Insiders    $918,021 $229,300  $9,883,600  63,842 
Outsiders    $1,664,844 $225,650 $18,600,000  23,100 
Large outside 
blockholders    $5,594,629 $364,325 $53,400,000  4,784 
          
Holdings          
Value:          
Insiders    $19,300,000 $540,000  $489,000,000  38359 
Outsiders    $19,300,000 $372,420  $232,000,000  18248 
Large outside 
blockholders    $182,000,000 $38,400,000 $1,020,000,000  1892 
Firm Characteristics 
   Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Governance Index    8.871  9.000  2.549  3242720 
Size (ln Assets)    6.949654 6.798271  1.562911  4445472 
Book to Market Value    0.3465644 0.2531666  0.3565734  4364541 
Total Return Volatility     0.0361817 0.0321841  0.0177241  4703901 
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Panel C: Sub-sample of firms for which we have information about the board 
Board Characteristics 
   Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Board Size    10.546  10  2.625  2739886 
Transaction Characteristics 
  Percentage Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Purchases         
% purchases:         
Insiders 51.42%        297,680 
Outsiders 47.27%        273,640 
Large outside blockholders  1.31%        7,560 
Value:         
Insiders    $129,933 $20,438  $1,221,657  297,480 
Outsiders    $263,990 $27,380  $5,615,971  273,360 
Large outside blockholders    $1,258,076 $75,000  $11,600,000  7,560 
         
Sales         
% sales:         
Insiders 260.35%        1,507,120 
Outsiders 94.41%        546,520 
Large outside blockholders  18.55%        107,360 
Value:         
Insiders    $857,249 $230,650  $4,951,097 1,506,080 
Outsiders    $1,633,742 $230,108  $18,300,000  546,360 
Large outside blockholders    $2,526,475 $314,750  $18,700,000  107,320 
         
Holdings         
Value:         
Insiders    $16,600,000 $598,494  $531,000,000 1,041,200 
Outsiders    $22,500,000 $461,296  $22,500,000  480,720 
Large outside blockholders    $152,000,000 $88,500,000 $286,000,000  49,320 
Firm Characteristics 
   Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Governance Index    9.112  9  2.509  2468840 
Size    7.383592 7.251558  1.459309  2611257 
Book to Market Value    0.375795 0.304409 0.3092056  2595166 
Total Return Volatility     0.0309633 0.0309633  0.0128887  2739886 
   37
 
Panel D: Sub-sample of firms that restated earnings 
Reasons for the Restatement 
  Percentage Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. Observations 
Acquisitions and mergers  7.01%        84,080 
Cost or expense  13.88%        166,509 
IPR&D 6.00%        71,962 
Loan-loss 0.12%        1,440 
Other 5.76%        69,042 
Reclassification 2.38%        28,600 
Related-party transactions  1.73%        20,760 
Restructuring, assets, or inventory  12.41%        148,887 
Revenue recognition  41.56%        498,546 
Securities related  4.73%        56,733 
Tax related  0.06%        760 
Unspecified 4.36%        52,320 
Prompter of the Restatement 
  Percentage Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. Observations 
Auditor 7.15%        53,320 
Company 55.07%        410,896 
Company/Auditor 1.25%        9,320 
Company/FASB 1.01%        7,507 
Company/SEC 1.19%        8,880 
External 0.02%        160 
FASB 0.76%        5,680 
SEC 0.3356        250,429 
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Panel D (cont.): Sub-sample of firms that restated earnings 
Transaction Characteristics 
  Percentage Mean  Median Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Purchases        
% purchases:        
Insiders 47.22%        163,169 
Outsiders 49.83%        172,209 
Large outside blockholders  2.95%        10,182 
Value          
Insiders   $106,625  $14,000  $1,378,591  162769 
Outsiders   $328,918  $17,750  $7,020,698  171889 
Large  outside  blockholders   $97,699  $16,920 $289,026  10182 
Sales        
% sales:          
Insiders 68.02%        580,907 
Outsiders 28.81%        246,040 
Large outside blockholders  3.17%        27,080 
Value        
Insiders    $667,981 $137,250 $3,773,338  580667 
Outsiders    $1,022,993 $143,200 $9,768,671  245720 
Large outside blockholders    $2,257,117 $109,025  $10,800,000  27040 
Holdings        
Value         
Insiders    9,479,081 391,133  79,100,000  266662 
Outsiders    9,188,739 327,520  53,300,000  150660 
Large outside blockholders    12,300,000 5,004,563  48,000,000  13160 
Firm Characteristics 
   Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Governance Index    9.750714  10  2.615369  560000 
Size (ln Assets)    6.353963 6.334149  2.050103  1175313 
Book to Market Value    0.4369596 0.3090955  0.4612581  1137372 








 Panel E: Purchases
Book to Market Quintile
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Size Quintile=1: Transactions:
Insider 8,219 4,554 4,576 5,598 8,977 31,924
Outsider 7,812 4,567 4,254 5,182 8,048 29,863
Large Blockholder 1,460 843 1,094 1,084 1,625 6,106
Total 17,491 9,964 9,924 11,864 18,650 67,893
Returns:
Insider 13.28% 16.68% 15.88% 19.30% 25.35% 18.58%
Outsider 7.42% 17.31% 15.41% 13.94% 18.41% 14.17%
Large Blockholder 4.98% -1.64% 19.18% 10.14% 25.16% 12.77%
Total 9.96% 15.40% 16.04% 16.14% 22.33% 16.12%
Size Quintile=2: Transactions:
Insider 3,624 2,320 1,852 1,802 2,006 11,604
Outsider 3,620 2,534 1,902 1,893 1,788 11,737
Large Blockholder 419 258 228 244 232 1,381
Total 7,663 5,112 3,982 3,939 4,026 24,722
Returns:
Insider 9.14% 15.18% 8.50% 12.85% 31.52% 14.65%
Outsider 4.12% 8.98% 11.66% 6.89% 24.06% 9.84%
Large Blockholder 24.43% 1.99% -2.17% 9.10% 59.23% 5.66%
Total 5.20% 11.44% 9.41% 9.75% 29.81% 11.88%
Size Quintile=3: Transactions:
Insider 3,120 1,831 1,412 1,237 911 8,511
Outsider 2,669 1,632 1,283 892 803 7,279
Large Blockholder 250 235 65 59 69 678
Total 6,039 3,698 2,760 2,188 1,783 16,468
Returns:
Insider 8.84% 14.03% 3.79% 4.62% 27.86% 10.52%
Outsider 7.12% 6.92% 4.20% 1.06% 25.63% 7.83%
Large Blockholder 6.66% -16.67% 6.52% 1.06% 26.58% -4.91%
Total 7.44% 8.92% 4.05% 3.09% 26.81% 8.70%
Size Quintile=4: Transactions:
Insider 2,577 1,457 921 878 532 6,365
Outsider 2,842 1,676 930 800 541 6,789
Large Blockholder 247 66 54 20 47 434
Total 5,666 3,199 1,905 1,698 1,120 13,588
Returns:
Insider 6.17% 3.06% 11.55% 9.87% 19.88% 7.88%
Outsider 4.65% 3.57% 0.60% 3.23% 3.32% 3.56%
Large Blockholder 2.75% 22.80% -5.77% 3.25% 72.01% 12.26%
Total 5.26% 3.73% 5.71% 6.65% 14.08% 5.86%
Size Quintile=5: Transactions:
Insider 2,877 1,265 890 555 18,512 24,099
Outsider 5,291 2,285 1,573 919 22,881 32,949
Large Blockholder 239 40 3 2 1,470 1,754
39Panel E: Sales
Book to Market Quintile
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Size Quintile=1: Transactions:
Insider 18,652 7,895 6,903 5,392 4,971 43,813
Outsider 12,830 5,299 4,171 3,305 3,459 29,064
Large Blockholder 2,465 990 536 548 628 5,167
Total 33,947 14,184 11,610 9,245 9,058 78,044
Returns:
Insider 6.41% -1.07% 2.04% 0.14% -4.43% 2.37%
Outsider 2.68% -0.52% -2.31% 0.79% -8.32% -0.14%
Large Blockholder 2.99% -0.57% -5.40% -2.28% 3.74% 0.96%
Total 4.75% -0.83% 0.14% 0.23% -5.34% 1.34%
Size Quintile=2: Transactions:
Insider 16,751 7,509 4,161 2,537 1,432 32,390
Outsider 8,641 3,929 1,931 1,285 1,003 16,789
Large Blockholder 2,165 477 244 263 93 3,242
Total 27,557 11,915 6,336 4,085 2,528 52,421
Returns:
Insider 1.47% -0.41% -2.85% -1.50% -3.68% 0.02%
Outsider 2.44% -1.63% -0.66% 0.71% -10.73% 0.23%
Large Blockholder -9.24% -4.37% -5.54% -8.69% -7.89% -8.16%
Total 0.93% -0.97% -2.29% -1.27% -6.60% -0.42%
Size Quintile=3: Transactions:
Insider 19,009 6,184 3,806 2,234 1,066 32,299
Outsider 8,398 2,880 1,547 887 582 14,294
Large Blockholder 1,212 362 291 209 34 2,108
Total 28,619 9,426 5,644 3,330 1,682 48,701
Returns:
Insider 0.04% 3.17% 1.33% -2.34% -1.39% 0.58%
Outsider -4.68% 1.59% 2.91% -6.49% -2.74% -2.63%
Large Blockholder -4.77% 0.86% 6.60% 7.82% -27.53% -1.34%
Total -1.55% 2.60% 2.03% -2.80% -2.39% -0.45%
Size Quintile=4: Transactions:
Insider 21,295 6,394 2,834 1,716 727 32,966
Outsider 7,717 2,430 1,121 739 287 12,294
Large Blockholder 1,395 330 115 107 43 1,990
Total 30,407 9,154 4,070 2,562 1,057 47,250
Returns:
Insider 0.75% -0.44% -0.57% -0.69% -7.12% 0.16%
Outsider -0.97% -2.54% -1.12% -2.28% -4.59% -1.46%
Large Blockholder -1.43% -3.95% 3.82% -25.87% -2.93% -2.92%
Total 0.21% -1.12% -0.60% -2.21% -6.26% -0.39%
Size Quintile=5: Transactions:
Insider 32,298 7,529 4,146 1,894 35,511 81,378
Outsider 10,424 2,136 1,156 435 21,002 35,153
Large Blockholder 1,098 77 95 22 2,287 3,579
40Table 2:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
market-adjusted returns
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is
a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the
company stock. Transaction measure the size of the transaction (measured in dollar value), while holding is the dollar
value of the individual’s holdings. Transaction if outsider is an interaction term between the size of the transaction
and the outsider dummy; similarly transaction if large blockholder is an interaction term between the transaction size
and the large blockholder dummy. In Panel A the regressions include only purchase transactions, while in Panel B
the regressions include only sale transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are
corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same individual.
41Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180) RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0030*** 0.0422*** 0.0652*** 0.0792*** 0.1210*** 0.0026*** 0.0510*** 0.0797*** 0.0954*** 0.1534***
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0038) (6.4103) (29.3408) (31.7107) (25.6144) (29.8552)
Outsider 0.0000 -0.0050*** -0.0096*** -0.0101*** -0.0212*** 0.0014** -0.0046 -0.0108*** -0.0152*** -0.0250***
(0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0056) (2.1472) (1.5983) (2.7044) (2.6029) (3.1135)
Large Blockholder -0.0014 -0.0123** -0.0130 -0.0050 -0.0029 -0.0032* -0.0189** -0.0251* -0.0283 -0.0388
(0.0010) (0.0056) (0.0084) (0.0118) (0.0223) (1.6779) (2.1874) (1.9404) (1.5091) (1.5012)
Transaction 0.005 0.0473 0.083 0.0058 -0.2882**
(0.5089) (0.9749) (0.7800) (0.0416) (2.0266)
Holdings 0.000 -0.0015*** -0.0021*** -0.0020*** -0.0033***
(0.3587) (3.4137) (2.8959) (2.9947) (2.7244)
Holdings if outsider -0.0001 0.0012*** 0.0014* 0.0014* 0.0027**
(0.8250) (2.6426) (1.7446) (1.7276) (2.0195)
Holdings if large blockholder 0.0008*** 0.0014 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.005
(3.0212) (1.1806) (0.4213) (0.5806) (1.5906)
Transaction if outsider -0.014 -0.0848 -0.1585 -0.1519 0.1000
(1.3676) (1.6345) (1.3971) (1.0301) (0.6734)
Transaction if large blockholder 0.0217 0.0917 0.0415 0.0642 0.2257
(1.1989) (1.2910) (0.3233) (0.4205) (1.2161)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 181473 181459 180789 179921 176065 55009 55007 54853 54707 54059
R-squared 0.103 0.195 0.222 0.260 0.298 0.1616 0.2214 0.2427 0.2848 0.3408
4
2Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180) RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0052*** -0.0018*** 0.0022** 0.0072*** 0.0160*** -0.0072*** -0.0014 -0.0029** -0.0035* -0.0112***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0013) (0.002) (28.0063) (1.3963) (2.0703) (1.9074) (3.6986)
Outsider 0.0010*** -0.0031** -0.0062*** -0.0112*** -0.0251*** 0.0015*** -0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0038 -0.0145**
(0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0044) (2.7127) (0.7744) (1.001) (0.8785) (2.261)
Large Blockholder 0.0023*** -0.0051 -0.0104* -0.0046 -0.0288** 0.0020** -0.0100* -0.0207*** -0.0183 -0.0219
(0.0006) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0079) (0.0118) (2.0375) (1.7124) (2.5878) (1.5202) (1.3209)
Transaction -0.0225* -0.0027 0.0486 0.0349 0.0699
(1.8395) (0.101) (1.061) (0.6575) (0.442)
Holdings 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(1.1821) (1.145) (0.667) (0.5377) (0.5933)
Holdings*Outsider 0.0000* 0.0003*** 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0004
(1.813) (3.0555) (2.3923) (1.5933) (1.2547)
Holdings*Large Blockholder 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001* 0.0002
(3.8804) (2.9467) (3.355) (1.8939) (1.0855)
Transaction* Outsider 0.0169 -0.0104 -0.0291 -0.0481 -0.0354
(1.2074) (0.3581) (0.5979) (0.8584) (0.2225)
Transaction*Large Blockholder 0.0203 0.0131 -0.0255 0.0103 -0.055
(1.4883) (0.2443) (0.3556) (0.1519) (0.3411)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346526 346469 344663 342845 336759 80598 80597 80539 80456 79827
R-squared 0.180 0.153 0.169 0.188 0.225 0.2959 0.1752 0.201 0.2375 0.2851
4
3Table 3:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
Strictly Independent Directors
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of
the company stock. In Panel A the regressions include only purchase transactions, while in Panel B the regressions
include only sale transactions. Strictly independent director is an indicator variable if the directors are classiﬁed strictly
independent according to the criteria of the Higgs report and otherwise equal to zero. According to the Higgs report
independent directors are those individuals in the board who are outsiders and not former employees, nor employees
of an organization to which the ﬁrm gives charity contributions. In addition, for a director to be deﬁned as strictly
independent, the Higgs report requires that she or he does not have any business transaction with the company, does
not give the company any professional service and is not a relative of any oﬃcer. Finally, a strictly independent director
does not have interlocking directorship with one of the executives, and does not have any other aﬃliation with the
company. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of
the observations within the same individual.
44Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0011*** 0.0367*** 0.0727*** 0.0735*** 0.1242***
(0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0061)
Outsider 0.0023 0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0066 0.0145
(0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0136) (0.0167) (0.0303)
Large Blockholder 0.0054** -0.0065 0.0058 0.0315 0.0207
(0.0026) (0.0124) (0.0237) (0.0344) (0.0466)
Strictly Independent (dummy) -0.0019 -0.001 -0.0138 -0.0148 -0.0444
(0.0018) (0.0075) (0.0135) (0.0170) (0.0305)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 21791 21791 21770 21737 21495
R-squared 0.121 0.254 0.31 0.365 0.389
45Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0059*** -0.0051*** -0.0089*** -0.0111*** -0.0302***
(0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0039)
Outsider -0.0001 0.0047 0.0065 0.005 -0.0045
(0.0006) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0074) (0.0129)
Large Blockholder 0.0043*** 0.0026 -0.0142 -0.0227* -0.0355*
(0.0007) (0.0057) (0.0091) (0.0126) (0.0192)
Strictly Independent (dummy) 0.001 -0.0013 0.0022 0.0036 0.0246
(0.0007) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.0101) (0.0173)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 82981 82977 82811 82699 82136
R-squared 0.051 0.118 0.142 0.161 0.192
46Table 4:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
controlling for Market to Book and Size
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the company
stock. Size is the natural log of ﬁrm’s assets. Book to Market is calculated as the sum of the market value of common
equity and total assets minus the book value of equity over the book value of equity. In Panel A the regressions include
only purchase transactions, while in Panel B the regressions include only sale transactions. All the regressions include
ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same
individual.
Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0136*** 0.0728*** 0.1290*** 0.1958*** 0.4574***
(0.0020) (0.0095) (0.0153) (0.0212) (0.0406)
Outsider 0.0000 -0.0059*** -0.0115*** -0.0144*** -0.0254***
(0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0063)
Large Blockholder -0.0019* -0.0125** -0.0152* -0.0199 -0.0334
(0.0011) (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0129) (0.0219)
Size -0.0027*** -0.0119*** -0.0236*** -0.0393*** -0.0960***
(0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0076)
Book to Market 0.0041*** 0.0449*** 0.0859*** 0.1255*** 0.2260***
(0.0006) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0146)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 133036 133029 132774 132554 131354
R-squared 0.101 0.199 0.228 0.284 0.309
47Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0060*** -0.0801*** -0.1594*** -0.2335*** -0.5339***
(0.0008) (0.0071) (0.0133) (0.0218) (0.0337)
Outsider 0.0010*** -0.0011 -0.0038* -0.0084*** -0.0203***
(0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0048)
Large Blockholder 0.0025*** -0.0027 -0.0091 -0.0027 -0.0206*
(0.0006) (0.0044) (0.0059) (0.0079) (0.0119)
Size 0.0001 0.0145*** 0.0312*** 0.0469*** 0.1061***
(0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0056)
Book to Market 0.000 -0.0174*** -0.0545*** -0.0865*** -0.1794***
(0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0094)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 282039 282030 281900 281696 280135
R-squared 0.193 0.147 0.168 0.194 0.238
48Table 5:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
accounting for return volatility
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the company
stock. The observations are split in quartile of total return volatility measured by the variance of returns over the
interval (-360,-20) trading days before the transaction, adjusted for the time span over which the return is calculated
(0, 20, 60, 90, and 180 trading days). In Panel A the regressions include only purchase transactions, while in Panel B
the regressions include only sale transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are
corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same individual.
49Panel A: Purchases
Total return volatility: ﬁrst quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0003 0.0082*** 0.0099*** 0.0086*** 0.0095***
(1.5349) (8.2942) (6.7916) (4.6266) (3.2856)
Outsider -0.0002 -0.0029** -0.0043** -0.002 -0.0074*
(0.4983) (2.0843) (2.0712) (0.7613) (1.8690)
Large Blockholder 0.0003 0.0016 0.0066 -0.005 0.0025
(0.2104) (0.2368) (0.7618) (0.4262) (0.1177)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 45084 45080 44917 44696 43731
R-squared 0.1416 0.2254 0.2718 0.2998 0.3743
Total return volatility: second quartile
Constant -0.0004 0.0275*** 0.0405*** 0.0450*** 0.0601***
(1.3373) (21.4512) (22.0962) (18.7740) (15.7250)
Outsider 0.0006 -0.0100*** -0.0157*** -0.0169*** -0.0273***
(1.3235) (5.0518) (5.4202) (4.2230) (4.4855)
Large Blockholder 0.0019 -0.0018 0.0061 -0.0096 -0.0368*
(1.3149) (0.2634) (0.6366) (0.7435) (1.8475)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 45085 45081 44908 44695 43730
R-squared 0.199 0.3131 0.3852 0.4175 0.4729
Total return volatility: third quartile
Constant 0.0012*** 0.0374*** 0.0631*** 0.0700*** 0.0955***
(2.7932) (21.2051) (23.1271) (19.8939) (17.7428)
Outsider 0.0019*** 0.003 -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0033
(2.7736) (1.0283) (0.3775) (0.0317) (0.3708)
Large Blockholder 0.001 0.0012 -0.0037 0.0058 0.0016
(0.6213) (0.1561) (0.3280) (0.4088) (0.0705)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 45080 45080 44912 44695 43733
R-squared 0.1747 0.314 0.3787 0.4289 0.4662
Total return volatility: fourth quartile
Constant 0.0109*** 0.0938*** 0.1445*** 0.1900*** 0.3178***
(16.5958) (30.4718) (31.5088) (27.2291) (29.0149)
Outsider -0.0014 -0.0078 -0.0144* -0.0185 -0.0491***
(1.2231) (1.4618) (1.8375) (1.5546) (2.7170)
Large Blockholder -0.0048** -0.0401*** -0.0473*** -0.0362 -0.0517
(2.1610) (3.3697) (2.7563) (1.5031) (1.3325)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 46224 46218 46052 45835 44871
R-squared 0.1522 0.2793 0.2986 0.3317 0.4066
50Panel B: Sales
Total return volatility: ﬁrst quartile
Constant -0.0021*** 0.0025*** 0.0063*** 0.0081*** 0.0087***
(24.9435) (5.1488) (8.7380) (8.8456) (6.0469)
Outsider 0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0028* -0.0038* -0.0041
(0.9250) (1.6236) (1.6965) (1.7767) (1.2199)
Large Blockholder 0.0006 -0.0074** -0.0128** -0.0028 -0.0154
(1.0119) (2.1527) (2.4088) (0.3714) (1.4175)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 86277 86262 85811 85357 83837
R-squared 0.0999 0.1745 0.2159 0.246 0.3279
Total return volatility: second quartile
Constant -0.0041*** -0.0035*** -0.0039*** -0.0005 0.0077***
(32.5654) (4.7127) (3.5079) (0.3329) (3.4750)
Outsider 0.0008*** -0.0051*** -0.0088*** -0.0138*** -0.0229***
(3.0781) (3.2216) (3.6618) (4.4025) (4.4216)
Large Blockholder 0.0020*** -0.0061 -0.0144** -0.006 -0.0203*
(2.9914) (1.4681) (2.2625) (0.7712) (1.7457)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 86276 86263 85811 85355 83832
R-squared 0.1056 0.2135 0.2633 0.296 0.3459
Total return volatility: third quartile
Constant -0.0061*** -0.0074*** -0.0073*** 0.0000 0.0001
(31.8194) (6.8194) (4.3148) (0.0116) (0.0470)
Outsider 0.0007* -0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0046 -0.0165**
(1.7530) (0.6426) (1.0067) (1.0007) (2.3691)
Large Blockholder 0.0038*** -0.0145*** -0.0173* -0.0257** -0.0319*
(4.3685) (2.5851) (1.8989) (2.1832) (1.8864)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 86277 86263 85811 85357 83835
R-squared 0.0988 0.224 0.2653 0.2957 0.3596
Total return volatility: fourth quartile
Constant -0.0086*** -0.0006 0.0106*** 0.0176*** 0.0388***
(23.1552) (0.2760) (3.2593) (4.0925) (6.2629)
Outsider 0.0023*** 0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0109 -0.0318**
(3.1389) (0.2448) (0.1945) (1.1089) (2.2127)
Large Blockholder 0.0025 0.0052 0.0031 0.0151 -0.0232
(1.6019) (0.5296) (0.2292) (0.7617) (0.8346)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 87696 87681 87230 86776 85255
R-squared 0.2394 0.2264 0.2396 0.2624 0.3129
51Table 6:
Insiders and Outsiders trading by governance:
market-adjusted returns
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the company
stock. The governance index is a measure constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) by counting the number
of governance provisions a ﬁrm has. More governance provisions (higher governance index) indicate worst governance.
Following Gompers et al. (2003) we classify companies with a governance index less or equal than 5, equal to 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13 and greater or equal than 14. Bad governance if outsider is an interaction term between companies with
a governance index greater or equal to 10 and outsider trading the stock. Bad governance if large blockholder is an
interaction term between companies with a governance index greater or equal to 10 and a large blockholder trading the
stock. In Panel A the regressions include only purchase transactions, while in Panel B the regressions include only sale
transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence
of the observations within the same individual.
52Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0013 0.0059 0.0167 0.0249 0.0224
(0.0019) (0.0097) (0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0327)
Outsider 0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0179*** -0.0177*** -0.0233**
(0.0006) (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0107)
Large Blockholder 0.0028 -0.0071 -0.0098 0.0125 -0.0063
(0.0022) (0.0127) (0.022) (0.029) (0.0403)
Governance=6 -0.0038* 0.0079 -0.0033 0.0193 0.0376
(0.002) (0.0097) (0.0232) (0.0238) (0.0346)
Governance=7 -0.0044** 0.0072 0.0056 0.0364* 0.1007***
(0.002) (0.0104) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0359)
Governance=8 -0.0025 0.0331*** 0.0578*** 0.0583** 0.1013**
(0.0021) (0.0115) (0.0203) (0.0233) (0.0397)
Governance=9 -0.0009 0.0302** 0.0616*** 0.0678*** 0.1520***
(0.0023) (0.0124) (0.0216) (0.025) (0.0402)
Governance=10 -0.0034 0.0136 0.0374* 0.0367 0.1037**
(0.0024) (0.0125) (0.0216) (0.0253) (0.0411)
Governance=11 -0.0019 0.0404*** 0.0727*** 0.0647** 0.1037**
(0.0025) (0.0128) (0.0225) (0.0264) (0.0432)
Governance=12 -0.0012 0.0585*** 0.0897*** 0.0781*** 0.1125**
(0.0027) (0.0141) (0.0237) (0.028) (0.0466)
Governance=13 -0.0015 0.0506*** 0.0853*** 0.0547* 0.1126**
(0.0028) (0.0148) (0.0247) (0.0289) (0.0483)
Governance geq 14 -0.0002 0.0735*** 0.1181*** 0.0918*** 0.1921***
(0.0031) (0.0159) (0.0259) (0.0306) (0.0496)
Bad Governance if outsider -0.0012 -0.0132** -0.0062 -0.01 -0.0171
(0.001) (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0099) (0.017)
Bad Governance if large blockholder 0.0004 0.0255 -0.0386 -0.0893 0.0358
(0.0056) (0.0212) (0.056) (0.0581) (0.0673)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 37263 37263 37203 37119 36566
R-squared 0.121 0.208 0.266 0.272 0.346
53Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0054*** -0.0229*** -0.0435*** -0.0545*** -0.1104***
(0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0078) (0.012) (0.0328)
Outsider 0.0011*** -0.0048** -0.0109*** -0.0170*** -0.0241***
(0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0064)
Large Blockholder 0.0040*** -0.0032 -0.0132* -0.0082 -0.0094
(0.0007) (0.0042) (0.0068) (0.0087) (0.0134)
Governance=6 0.0002 0.0110** 0.0176** 0.0225** 0.0809***
(0.0007) (0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0107) (0.028)
Governance=7 0.0012 0.0135*** 0.0260*** 0.0301** 0.0669
(0.0008) (0.0049) (0.0087) (0.0148) (0.0469)
Governance=8 0.0007 0.0188*** 0.0377*** 0.0472*** 0.0986**
(0.0008) (0.0056) (0.0095) (0.0144) (0.0386)
Governance=9 0.0003 0.0243*** 0.0513*** 0.0723*** 0.1093***
(0.0009) (0.0061) (0.0108) (0.0163) (0.0396)
Governance=10 0.0014 0.0434*** 0.0717*** 0.0940*** 0.1529***
(0.0009) (0.0063) (0.0108) (0.0161) (0.0393)
Governance=11 0.0004 0.0324*** 0.0516*** 0.0649*** 0.1151***
(0.0009) (0.0065) (0.0108) (0.0159) (0.0395)
Governance=12 0.0001 0.0331*** 0.0517*** 0.0723*** 0.1354***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.0116) (0.0167) (0.0399)
Governance=13 0.0012 0.0343*** 0.0667*** 0.0751*** 0.1345***
(0.0011) (0.0071) (0.012) (0.0172) (0.0405)
Governance geq 14 0.0002 0.0380*** 0.0763*** 0.0923*** 0.1557***
(0.0013) (0.0085) (0.0145) (0.0197) (0.0424)
Bad Governance if outsider -0.0002 0.0042 0.0023 0.004 -0.0062
(0.0005) (0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0111)
Bad Governance if large blockholder -0.0015 -0.0341** -0.0356 -0.0662** -0.0938
(0.0021) (0.0174) (0.0224) (0.0336) (0.067)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 114529 114517 114004 113543 112224
R-squared 0.057 0.138 0.159 0.175 0.205
54Panel C: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0061 0.0056 0.0067 0.0173 -0.0064
(0.0053) (0.0226) (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0673)
Outsider 0.0005 0.0163* 0.0235* 0.0355** 0.0458
(0.0028) (0.0084) (0.0133) (0.0180) (0.0310)
Large Blockholder 0.0055 0.0034 0.0529* 0.081 0.0208
(0.0048) (0.0212) (0.0310) (0.0505) (0.0580)
Transaction -0.0144 -0.0124 0.1133 0.1849* 0.4119
(0.0165) (0.0654) (0.0892) (0.0960) (0.3043)
Holdings 0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0010** -0.0009** -0.0017***
0.0000 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Strictly Independent (dummy) 0.001 -0.0128 -0.0284** -0.0394** -0.0666**
(0.0028) (0.0088) (0.0136) (0.0183) (0.0311)
Governance=6 -0.0032 -0.0052 -0.0494 -0.0311 -0.0457
(0.0060) (0.0211) (0.0565) (0.0552) (0.0747)
Governance=7 -0.0063 -0.0334 -0.0673 -0.0551 -0.0838
(0.0058) (0.0247) (0.0486) (0.0495) (0.0811)
Governance=8 -0.0132** -0.0101 -0.0113 -0.008 -0.0075
(0.0060) (0.0251) (0.0488) (0.0500) (0.0747)
Governance=9 -0.0091 0.0197 0.0609 0.075 0.2065**
(0.0063) (0.0288) (0.0522) (0.0526) (0.0818)
Governance=10 -0.0139** 0.0263 0.0552 0.0471 0.1778**
(0.0066) (0.0291) (0.0527) (0.0537) (0.0867)
Governance=11 -0.0085 0.0513* 0.0966* 0.0604 0.1881**
(0.0067) (0.0298) (0.0531) (0.0553) (0.0865)
Governance=12 -0.0077 0.0888*** 0.1575*** 0.1069* 0.1895**
(0.0070) (0.0315) (0.0552) (0.0585) (0.0898)
Governance=13 -0.0069 0.0778** 0.1534*** 0.0929 0.2175**
(0.0070) (0.0318) (0.0558) (0.0598) (0.0905)
Governance geq 14 0.001 0.1388*** 0.2480*** 0.1695** 0.3733***
(0.0079) (0.0375) (0.0617) (0.0710) (0.1056)
Bad Governance * Strictly Independent -0.0031 -0.0266*** -0.0256** -0.0313** -0.0112
(0.0019) (0.0084) (0.0129) (0.0156) (0.0232)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11916 11916 11910 11905 11840
R-squared 0.158 0.234 0.271 0.285 0.391
55Panel D: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0106*** -0.0179* -0.0422*** -0.0319 -0.0745**
(0.0019) (0.0095) (0.0143) (0.0194) (0.0331)
Outsider -0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0045 -0.0116 -0.0199
(0.0008) (0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0075) (0.0123)
Large Blockholder 0.0041*** -0.0153** -0.0267*** -0.0104 -0.0005
(0.0014) (0.0066) (0.0097) (0.0124) (0.0168)
Transaction 0.0056 -0.0115 0.0158 0.011 -0.1076**
(0.0059) (0.0235) (0.0420) (0.0332) (0.0490)
Holdings 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Strictly Independent (dummy) 0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0019 -0.0006 0.0058
(0.0010) (0.0050) (0.0075) (0.0098) (0.0159)
Governance=6 0.0036* 0.0201** 0.0304** 0.0153 0.0979***
(0.0020) (0.0098) (0.0134) (0.0177) (0.0301)
Governance=7 0.0081*** 0.0126 0.0218 -0.0057 0.005
(0.0022) (0.0110) (0.0157) (0.0213) (0.0372)
Governance=8 0.0053** 0.0204* 0.0573*** 0.0380* 0.0799**
(0.0022) (0.0109) (0.0168) (0.0225) (0.0406)
Governance=9 0.0050** 0.0304** 0.0606*** 0.0595** 0.0930**
(0.0023) (0.0121) (0.0194) (0.0275) (0.0465)
Governance=10 0.0053** 0.0488*** 0.0795*** 0.0846*** 0.1199***
(0.0025) (0.0137) (0.0200) (0.0280) (0.0458)
Governance=11 0.0037 0.0369*** 0.0579*** 0.0402 0.0721
(0.0027) (0.0136) (0.0200) (0.0275) (0.0454)
Governance=12 0.0018 0.0231 0.0371* 0.0248 0.0239
(0.0028) (0.0144) (0.0219) (0.0297) (0.0474)
Governance=13 0.0047 0.0236 0.037 0.0129 -0.0368
(0.0031) (0.0156) (0.0238) (0.0314) (0.0494)
Governance geq 14 0.0072** 0.0129 0.0373 0.0567 0.0479
(0.0035) (0.0192) (0.0285) (0.0392) (0.0554)
Bad Governance * Strictly Independent -0.0001 0.0038 0.0032 0.0084 0.0157
(0.0016) (0.0074) (0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0210)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 25983 25983 25979 25970 25860
R-squared 0.105 0.143 0.171 0.184 0.225
56Table 7:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
Committees
In this table the sample is limited to observations for which we have committees information. The dependent
variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180 trading days,
respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider is a dummy
equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is a dummy equal
to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the company stock. The
committees variables (e.g. audit committee, governance committee, etc..) are indicator variable equal to one if the
individual trading belongs to a committee and zero otherwise. The interaction terms (e.g. outsider in audit committee,
Outsider in governance committee) are indicator variables equal to one if the individual trading belongs to a committee
and it is also an independent director (but not a large blockholder). In Panel A the regressions include only purchase
transactions, while in Panel B the regressions include only sale transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed
eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same individual.
57Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0016*** 0.0360*** 0.0633*** 0.0652*** 0.1192***
(0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0064)
Outsider 0.0019 0.0187** -0.0084 -0.0141 -0.0088
(0.0032) (0.0095) (0.0240) (0.0246) (0.0337)
Large Blockholder 0.0104** 0.0269 0.0383 0.0603 -0.0085
(0.0047) (0.0176) (0.0267) (0.0388) (0.0461)
Transaction -0.0121 -0.033 0.1082 0.1488 0.3605
(0.0179) (0.0739) (0.0866) (0.0968) (0.2697)
Holdings 0.0001 -0.0007** -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0021***
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Strictly Independent (dummy) -0.0017 -0.0226** -0.0088 -0.0199 -0.0573
(0.0033) (0.0109) (0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0366)
Audit Committee 0.0005 -0.0044 0.0525 0.0461 -0.0064
(0.0039) (0.0129) (0.0332) (0.0360) (0.0512)
Compensation Committee 0.0025 0.0031 0.035 0.0421 0.0929*
(0.0033) (0.0114) (0.0284) (0.0329) (0.0560)
Nominating Committee -0.0017 -0.0182 -0.0232 -0.0078 0.0295
(0.0028) (0.0118) (0.0165) (0.0207) (0.0393)
Corporate Gov. Committee 0.0026 0.0138 0.0028 0.0105 -0.045
(0.0051) (0.0163) (0.0230) (0.0252) (0.0446)
Executive Committee -0.0015 0.0048 0.0165 -0.004 0.0095
(0.0020) (0.0081) (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0249)
Str. Indep in audit committee -0.0002 0.0054 -0.0408 -0.0296 0.0321
(0.0041) (0.0142) (0.0350) (0.0380) (0.0542)
Str. Indep in compensation committee -0.0034 -0.0054 -0.0325 -0.029 -0.0704
(0.0036) (0.0129) (0.0303) (0.0349) (0.0587)
Str. Indep in nominating committee -0.0003 0.0178 0.0221 0.014 0.0034
(0.0032) (0.0137) (0.0193) (0.0240) (0.0426)
Str. Indep in corporate gov. committee -0.0006 0.0033 0.0147 0.012 0.049
(0.0053) (0.0185) (0.0263) (0.0285) (0.0485)
Str. Indep in executive committee 0.0044 -0.0095 -0.0264 -0.0079 -0.0123
(0.0029) (0.0121) (0.0187) (0.0209) (0.0322)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 14009 14009 14003 13998 13929
R-squared 0.154 0.237 0.277 0.336 0.402
58Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0071*** -0.0016 -0.0075*** -0.0126*** -0.0425***
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0035)
Outsider -0.0009 0.0037 0.002 0.0003 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0054) (0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0168)
Large Blockholder 0.0027** -0.0096 -0.0267*** -0.0107 -0.0338
(0.0012) (0.0061) (0.0099) (0.0129) (0.0225)
Transaction 0.002 -0.0126 0.0182 -0.0173 -0.1022
(0.0055) (0.0248) (0.0412) (0.0498) (0.0826)
Holdings 0 0 0 0 0.0001
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0001)
Strictly Independent (dummy) 0.002 -0.004 0.0180* 0.0126 0.0329
(0.0014) (0.0081) (0.0108) (0.0145) (0.0244)
Audit Committee -0.0015 -0.005 0.0019 0.0068 0.0295
(0.0015) (0.0078) (0.0110) (0.0146) (0.0244)
Compensation Committee 0.0015 0.0086 0 0.0046 0.009
(0.0015) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0256)
Nominating Committee -0.001 0.0013 -0.004 0.0015 -0.0145
(0.0014) (0.0079) (0.0114) (0.0162) (0.0251)
Corporate Gov. Committee 0.0047** -0.0043 0.0121 -0.0023 0.0293
(0.0019) (0.0099) (0.0139) (0.0187) (0.0310)
Executive Committee 0.0015* 0.0054 0.0163*** 0.0052 0.0182
(0.0008) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0118)
Str. Indep in audit committee 0.0036* 0.0129 -0.0012 0.0054 -0.0242
(0.0019) (0.0101) (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0314)
Str. Indep in compensation committee -0.0007 0.0019 0.0014 0.0053 0.0003
(0.0019) (0.0104) (0.0142) (0.0187) (0.0331)
Str. Indep in nominating committee -0.0017 -0.0089 -0.0122 -0.0104 0.0374
(0.0021) (0.0110) (0.0152) (0.0213) (0.0346)
Str. Indep in corporate gov. committee -0.0038 -0.0044 -0.031 -0.0079 -0.0756*
(0.0028) (0.0139) (0.0196) (0.0251) (0.0410)
Str. Indep in executive committee -0.0009 -0.0149* -0.0276** -0.0197 -0.0487**
(0.0017) (0.0087) (0.0120) (0.0153) (0.0236)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 34082 34082 34078 34069 33950
R-squared 0.085 0.123 0.147 0.168 0.197
59Table 8:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
Size of the Board
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is
a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the
company stock. Board size is the size of the board from Fich and Shivdasani (2005). Big board if outsider and big
board if large blockholder are indicator variables if the board is large (above the median) and the individual trading
is a independent director (but not a large blockholder) and a large blockholder. Panel A the regressions include only
purchase transactions, while in Panel B the regressions include only sale transactions. All the regressions include
ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same
individual.
Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0017 0.084 0.0417 0.1242 0.4164**
(0.0104) (0.0534) (0.0939) (0.1107) (0.1639)
Outsider 0.001 -0.0086* -0.0396*** -0.0429*** -0.0580***
(0.0009) (0.0048) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0143)
Large Blockholder 0.0066* -0.0185 0.031 0.1397* 0.1565
(0.0035) (0.0208) (0.0349) (0.0825) (0.1095)
Board size -0.0018 -0.0208 0.0153 -0.0203 -0.1301*
(0.0044) (0.0226) (0.0400) (0.0469) (0.0693)
Big board if outsiders 0.0009 0.0096 0.0263** 0.0357** 0.0603***
(0.0015) (0.0077) (0.0112) (0.0141) (0.0215)
Big board if large blockholders -0.0175** -0.0413 -0.0183 -0.2185** -0.192
(0.0084) (0.0324) (0.0628) (0.0963) (0.1447)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 14472 14472 14462 14435 14202
R-squared 0.123 0.239 0.291 0.312 0.376
60Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0097*** -0.0872*** -0.1335** -0.1199* -0.1333
(0.0033) (0.0332) (0.0530) (0.0695) (0.1412)
Outsider 0.0003 -0.0064 -0.0168** -0.0302*** -0.0480***
(0.0004) (0.0047) (0.0078) (0.0100) (0.0149)
Large Blockholder 0.0033*** 0.0079 -0.0076 -0.0192* -0.0309*
(0.0009) (0.0089) (0.0097) (0.0112) (0.0176)
Board size 0.0021 0.0371*** 0.0551** 0.0484 0.0492
(0.0014) (0.0142) (0.0227) (0.0297) (0.0603)
Big board if outsiders 0.0005 0.0048 0.0190** 0.0336*** 0.0587***
(0.0006) (0.0058) (0.0095) (0.0126) (0.0219)
Big board if large blockholders -0.0025 -0.0390*** -0.0400** 0.0008 -0.0194
(0.0018) (0.0127) (0.0165) (0.0201) (0.0323)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 54025 54021 53933 53819 53238
R-squared 0.056 0.122 0.144 0.175 0.211
61Table 9:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
controlling for the presence of institutional
investors
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of
the company stock. High fraction of institutional investor is an indicator variable equal to one if the percentage of
company’s outstanding common shares held by institutions is larger than 30%. Designated director is a dummy variable
if the director is a designee under a documented agreement between the company and a group of shareholders or a
signiﬁcant shareholder. In Panel A the regressions include only purchase transactions, while in Panel B the regressions
include only sale transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the
non-independence of the observations within the same individual.
Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0019 0.0484*** 0.1088*** 0.1156*** 0.1938***
(0.0014) (0.0076) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0227)
Outsider 0.0022 -0.0039 -0.0171 -0.0273* -0.0338
(0.0020) (0.0076) (0.0125) (0.0160) (0.0283)
Large Blockholder 0.0097** -0.0107 -0.0187 -0.0491 -0.0989
(0.0044) (0.0180) (0.0304) (0.0496) (0.0742)
High fraction of institutional investors 0.001 -0.0134 -0.0420*** -0.0485*** -0.0777***
(0.0015) (0.0083) (0.0115) (0.0134) (0.0246)
High fraction of institutional investors if str. Independent 0.0016 -0.0219** -0.0390*** -0.0520*** -0.0937***
(0.0019) (0.0099) (0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0298)
High fraction of institutional investors if large blockholder -0.0041 0.0176 0.0496 0.0951 0.1257
(0.0043) (0.0203) (0.0403) (0.0637) (0.0857)
Strictly Independent (dummy) -0.0024 0.0106 0.0063 0.0162 0.0237
(0.0024) (0.0101) (0.0153) (0.0213) (0.0378)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 21051 21051 21032 21002 20768
R-squared 0.128 0.255 0.317 0.374 0.4
62Panel B: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0055*** -0.0076* -0.0053 -0.0044 -0.0069
(0.0005) (0.0046) (0.0071) (0.0116) (0.0208)
Outsider -0.0004 0.0036 0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0122
(0.0006) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0085) (0.0147)
Large Blockholder 0.0043*** 0.0165 -0.0075 0.0045 -0.0101
(0.0013) (0.0214) (0.0255) (0.0298) (0.0542)
High fraction of institutional investors -0.0005 0.0017 -0.0057 -0.0098 -0.0288
(0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0077) (0.0125) (0.0220)
High fraction of institutional investors if str. Independent 0.0023** -0.0074 0.0068 0.023 0.0332
(0.0010) (0.0089) (0.0141) (0.0186) (0.0279)
High fraction of institutional investors if large blockholder 0.0001 -0.0147 -0.006 -0.0365 -0.0415
(0.0013) (0.0255) (0.0312) (0.0364) (0.0708)
Strictly Independent (dummy) 0.0023** -0.0074 0.0068 0.023 0.0332
(0.0010) (0.0089) (0.0141) (0.0186) (0.0279)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 80591 80587 80426 80317 79820
R-squared 0.052 0.119 0.143 0.161 0.187
63Table 10:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
Does Attendance Matter?
The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider
is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the company
stock. Attendance is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the director attended less than 75% of the meetings.
In Panel A the regressions include only purchase transactions, while in Panel B the regressions include only sale
transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence
of the observations within the same individual.
Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0018* 0.0266*** 0.0565*** 0.0451*** 0.0656***
(0.0010) (0.0047) (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0147)
Outsider 0.0009 0.0061 -0.0065 -0.0036 0.0101
(0.0013) (0.0060) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0186)
Large Blockholder 0.0039 -0.0051 0.0637** 0.1104* 0.1484*
(0.0047) (0.0173) (0.0319) (0.0571) (0.0855)
Attendance 0.0211 -0.1315*** 0.1119 0.0896* 0.1867
(0.0289) (0.0472) (0.1163) (0.0536) (0.2186)
Attendance if outsider -0.0221 0.1378*** -0.133 -0.1361** -0.2583
(0.0290) (0.0499) (0.1186) (0.0593) (0.2213)
Attendance if large blockholder -0.0281 0.1889*** -0.1035 -0.0324 -0.0351
(0.0290) (0.0582) (0.1235) (0.0833) (0.2308)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11195 11195 11183 11167 11052
R-squared 0.164 0.329 0.362 0.389 0.417
64Panel B: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0028*** 0.0068** 0.0133*** 0.0198*** 0.0161*
(0.0003) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0058) (0.0089)
Outsider -0.0021*** -0.0072 -0.0129* -0.0211** -0.0316**
(0.0005) (0.0054) (0.0076) (0.0101) (0.0157)
Large Blockholder 0.0019* -0.0115 -0.0367*** -0.0344** -0.0349
(0.0011) (0.0085) (0.0121) (0.0144) (0.0217)
Attendance 0.0037 0.0299 0.014 -0.0255 -0.0616
(0.0037) (0.0331) (0.0472) (0.0437) (0.0681)
Attendance if outsider 0.0011 -0.0456 -0.0323 0.0212 0.0197
(0.0044) (0.0369) (0.0539) (0.0559) (0.0809)
Attendance if large blockholder -0.0024 0.0253 0.1085 0.0426 0.0112
(0.0065) (0.0567) (0.1209) (0.0778) (0.1802)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 29490 29490 29455 29432 29217
R-squared 0.075 0.185 0.225 0.271 0.337
65Table 11:
Insiders and Outsider Trading and Earning
Restatements
The sample is reduced a subsample of ﬁrms that were subject to a restatement due to accounting irregularities.
We use a dataset collected by Gao (2002) that includes companies from Jan 1 1997 to June 30 2002 and contains 919
restatements resulting from accounting irregularities. In Panel A, columns (1) and (2) the left hand side is a dummy
variable if the individual has sold his/her of stocks between 0 and 40 trading days after the restatement of earnings
and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4) of Panel A the left hand side is a dummy variable if the individual has
sold his/her stock between -400 and 0 trading days before the restatement of earnings and zero otherwise. In column
(5) and (6) the left hand side is a dummy variable if the individual has purchased company’s stocks between 0 and
40 trading days before the restatement of earnings and zero otherwise. All the columns report the marginal eﬀect in
probit regression. Outsider is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an outside director. Revenue recognition is an
indicator variable equal to one if the restatement was due to an improperly recognized revenues, or any other mistakes or
improprieties were made that led to misreported revenue. Revenue recognition if outsider (large blockholder) is revenue
recognition interacted with an indicator variable on whether the individual trading is an independent director (large
blockholder). External prompter is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the prompter of the restatement is outside the
ﬁrm, and equal to zero otherwise. External prompter if outsider (large blockholder) is our external prompter variable
interacted with an indicator variable on whether the individual trading is an independent director (large blockholder).
The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same individual??. In Panel
B and C, the sample is restricted to the trades (Purchases in panel B and Sales in Panel C) that took place within
(-40,+40) trading days around the restatement announcement. The dependent variable is the market adjusted return
of holding the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180 trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1
dollar mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an independent
director, but not a large blockholder; large blockholder is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a director in the
board, is not an oﬃcer, and owns more than 10% of the company stock. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects.
The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same individual.
Panel A: Probit Regressions - Marginal Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outsider 0.0018** 0.0021* -0.002 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Revenue Recognition 0.0012 0.0014 0.0012**
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0006)
External Prompter -0.0022 -0.0019 0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0006)
Revenue Recognition if Outsider -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0006
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0009)
External Prompter if Outsider 0.0018 -0.0049 -0.0017
(0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0012)
Observations 29994 29994 29994 29482 29062 29062
66Panel B: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0325*** -0.0228 0.0098 -0.0696*** -0.0503***
(0.0078) (0.0145) (0.0122) (0.0155) (0.0177)
Outsider 0.0586*** 0.0167 0.0181 0.0544* 0.0783**
(0.0162) (0.0248) (0.0229) (0.0313) (0.0377)
Large Blockholder 0.0238 0.0692 0.0118 0.0339 -0.2077
(0.0165) (0.0575) (0.0189) (0.0208) (0.1375)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 175 175 175 175 168
R-squared 0.518 0.736 0.927 0.952 0.977
67Panel C: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0052*** 0.0430*** 0.0640*** 0.0612*** -0.0282***
(0.0018) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0060)
Outsider 0.0033 0.0379*** -0.0022 -0.0089 -0.0105
(0.0039) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0171) (0.0144)
Large Blockholder 0.0442*** -0.2504*** -0.0942** -0.1200*** -0.2503***
(0.0062) (0.0653) (0.0440) (0.0251) (0.0021)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 339 339 337
R-squared 0.42 0.886 0.881 0.92 0.945
68Panel D: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0607*** 0.0404** -0.1724*** -0.0870*** -0.0216
(0.0146) (0.0200) (0.0530) (0.0192) (0.0428)
Outsider 0.0517** -0.0025 0.0402 0.1159* 0.0156
(0.0215) (0.0392) (0.0249) (0.0643) (0.0801)
Large Blockholder 0.0258 0.0633 0.0168 0.0486 -0.2136
(0.0202) (0.0585) (0.0209) (0.0300) (0.1333)
Revenue Recognition 0.000 0.000 0.3613*** 0.000 -0.0449
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0967) (0.000) (0.0791)
External Prompter 0.1453*** -0.3084*** 0.000 0.0786 0.000
(0.0518) (0.0827) (0.000) (0.0981) (0.000)
RevRecOUT (Interaction) 0.0309 0.0066 -0.0203 -0.0509 0.1155
(0.0304) (0.0484) (0.0380) (0.0663) (0.0875)
ExtPrOUT (Interaction) -0.0588** 0.0846 -0.0576 -0.1780* -0.0207
(0.0250) (0.0690) (0.0711) (0.0940) (0.0788)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 175 175 175 175 168
R-squared 0.531 0.741 0.933 0.954 0.978
69Panel E: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0070*** 0.0526*** 0.0838*** 0.0387*** 0.0406***
(0.0017) (0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0061)
Outsider -0.0087 0.0604*** 0.0188** 0.0098 -0.0081
(0.0071) (0.0181) (0.0093) (0.0082) (0.0301)
Large Blockholder 0.0442*** -0.2504*** -0.0942** -0.1200*** -0.2503***
(0.0063) (0.0656) (0.0442) (0.0252) (0.0021)
Revenue Recognition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.1412
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
External Prompter 0.0125 -0.0549*** -0.1146*** 0.1296*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RevRecOUT (Interaction) 0.0118 -0.0396* -0.0370* -0.0197 -0.0043
(0.0080) (0.0213) (0.0192) (0.0321) (0.0357)
ExtPrOUT (Interaction) 0.0404*** -0.0096 -0.0084 -0.0587*** -0.0005
(0.0123) (0.0530) (0.0490) (0.0205) (0.0374)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 339 339 337
R-squared 0.426 0.886 0.882 0.92 0.945
70Table 12:
Insiders and Outsiders trading:
Sub-sample of Firms that Restated Earnings
The sample is reduced a subsample of ﬁrms that were subject to a restatement due to accounting irregularities.
We use a dataset collected by Gao (2002) that includes companies from Jan 1 1997 to June 30 2002 and contains 919
restatements resulting from accounting irregularities. The dependent variable is the market adjusted return of holding
the individual’s position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180 trading days, respectively (i.e. the returns of investing 1 dollar
mimicking the trade in the company stock). Outsider is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is an outside director;
outside block-holders is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is not an oﬃcer, but owns more than 10% of the company
stock. Revenue recognition is an indicator variable equal to one if the restatement was due to an improperly recognized
revenues, or any other mistakes or improprieties were made that led to misreported revenue. Revenue recognition
if outsider (large blockholder) is revenue recognition interacted with an indicator variable on whether the individual
trading is an independent director (large blockholder). External prompter is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
prompter of the restatement is outside the ﬁrm, and equal to zero otherwise. External prompter if outsider (large
blockholder) is our external prompter variable interacted with an indicator variable on whether the individual trading
is an independent director (large blockholder). In Panel A and B the regressions include only purchase transactions,
while in Panel C and D the regressions include only sale transactions. All the regressions include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects.
The standard errors are corrected for the non-independence of the observations within the same individual.
Panel A: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0004 0.0431*** 0.0660*** 0.0879*** 0.1468***
(0.0010) (0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0145)
Outsider 0.0017 0.0002 0.0012 -0.0128 -0.0111
(0.0017) (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0136) (0.0208)
Large Blockholder -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.049 -0.0569 -0.2024**
(0.0041) (0.0304) (0.0352) (0.0586) (0.0957)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 8642 8641 8633 8628 8578
R-squared 0.077 0.2 0.159 0.162 0.225
71Panel B: Purchases
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant 0.0032** 0.0447*** 0.0688*** 0.0902*** 0.1497***
(0.0014) (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0111) (0.0170)
Outsider -0.0039* -0.002 -0.005 -0.016 -0.0146
(0.0023) (0.0092) (0.0134) (0.0169) (0.0272)
Large Blockholder -0.0049 -0.0344 -0.0465 -0.0782 -0.2253
(0.0061) (0.0377) (0.0482) (0.0861) (0.1447)
Revenue Recognition -0.0054*** -0.0044 -0.0101 -0.0155 -0.0334
(0.0019) (0.0072) (0.0112) (0.0149) (0.0234)
External Prompter -0.0028 0.002 0.0047 0.0186 0.0477
(0.0030) (0.0095) (0.0164) (0.0230) (0.0299)
Revenue Recognition if outsider 0.0105*** 0.0066 0.018 0.0234 0.0496
(0.0038) (0.0137) (0.0217) (0.0276) (0.0410)
External Prompter if Outsider 0.0106 0.083 -0.0661 0.0101 -0.0844
(0.0080) (0.0740) (0.0706) (0.1208) (0.1770)
Revenue Recognition if large blockholder 0.0069 -0.0024 -0.0047 -0.0281 -0.0736
(0.0056) (0.0176) (0.0304) (0.0414) (0.0517)
External Prompter if large blockholder 0.0006 -0.0068 0.1365** 0.0985 0.3154**
(0.0091) (0.0639) (0.0616) (0.1016) (0.1503)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 8642 8641 8633 8628 8578
R-squared 0.079 0.201 0.16 0.162 0.226
72Panel C: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0063*** -0.0064*** -0.0111*** -0.0064 -0.0061
(0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0054) (0.0076)
Outsider 0.0019** -0.0013 -0.0053 -0.0198* -0.0297*
(0.0008) (0.0048) (0.0079) (0.0109) (0.0160)
Large Blockholder -0.0011 -0.0099 0.0097 -0.0344 -0.0576
(0.0056) (0.0203) (0.0281) (0.0377) (0.0419)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 21352 21352 21350 21313 21233
R-squared 0.065 0.097 0.104 0.132 0.159
73Panel D: Sales
Market adjusted return of holding the individual position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RET(t) RET(t+30) RET(t+60) RET(t+90) RET(t+180)
Constant -0.0061*** -0.0054** -0.0114*** -0.0056 -0.0061
(0.0005) (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0085)
Outsider 0.0009 -0.008 -0.0068 -0.0255 -0.0267
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0121) (0.0177) (0.0256)
Large Blockholder -0.0073 0.0108 0.1140*** 0.0556 -0.0849
(0.0076) (0.0314) (0.0435) (0.0512) (0.0753)
Revenue Recognition 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0033 -0.0075 -0.0048
(0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0082)
External Prompter -0.0007 -0.0004 0.004 0.0071 0.0077
(0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0061) (0.0093)
Revenue Recognition if outsider 0.0003 0.0104 0.0108 0.0237 0.0093
(0.0016) (0.0090) (0.0149) (0.0212) (0.0308)
External Prompter if Outsider 0.0226* -0.0137 -0.1154** -0.0557 0.0909
(0.0126) (0.0420) (0.0508) (0.0643) (0.0902)
Revenue Recognition if Large blockholder 0.0029 0.0069 -0.011 -0.0179 -0.0274
(0.0018) (0.0114) (0.0182) (0.0250) (0.0377)
External Prompter if Large Blockholder -0.0257 -0.0435 -0.1214* -0.1949* -0.0922
(0.0167) (0.0546) (0.0691) (0.1056) (0.0937)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 21352 21352 21350 21313 21233
R-squared 0.067 0.098 0.106 0.134 0.159









































Insiders Outsiders Outside Blockholders
Figure 1: Average number of transactions for three diﬀerent types of individuals: (i) executives of the ﬁrm, (ii) non executive directors
who are large blockholders (own more than 10% of the company stock), and (iii) directors who are neither employees of the ﬁrm, nor large
blockholders (outside or independent directors).
7
5Figure 2: Returns from Insider and Outsider Trading - Purchase Transactions
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meanCARInsiders (-20) meanCAROutsiders (-20)
Figure 2: Returns (mean and median CARs, Raw Returns, and Market Adjusted Returns) over the
time horizon, for purchase transactions correspond to the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking
the trade in the company stock for the (i) executives of the ﬁrm, and (ii) directors who are neither
employees of the ﬁrm, nor large blockholders (outside or independent directors). 76Figure 3: Returns from Insider and Outsider Trading - Sales Transactions
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Figure 3: Returns (mean and median CARs, Raw Returns, and Market Adjusted Returns) over the
time horizon, for sales transactions correspond to the returns of investing 1 dollar mimicking the trade
in the company stock for the (i) executives of the ﬁrm, and (ii) directors who are neither employees
of the ﬁrm, nor large blockholders (outside or independent directors). 77Figure 4: Comparison of Insider and Outsider Returns with Outside Blockholders’
Returns













































































































































































































Figure 4: Market Adjusted Returns over the time horizon, for purchases and sales transactions
correspond for the (i) executives of the ﬁrm, (ii) directors who are neither employees of the ﬁrm, nor
large blockholders (outside or independent directors), and (iii) large outside blockholders. 78Figure 5: T tests
H0:   Mkt adj r et I nsi der t=0
Insiders - Purchase Transactions







































t-stat Insiders lower bound upper bound
Insiders - Sales Transactions









































t-stat Insiders lower bound upper bound
H0:   Mkt adj r et Out si der , t  =:   Mkt adj r et I nsi der , t  ;   H0:   :   Mkt adj r et Out si der Bl ckhl dr ,   t  =:   Mkt adj r et I nsi der ,   t  
Outsiders and Outside Blockholders - Purchase Transactions
T tests adjusted for clustering at the firm level











































t-stat Outsiders t-stat Outside Blockholders lower bound upper bound
Outsiders and Outside Blockholders - Sales Transactions
T tests adjusted for clustering at the firm level









































t-stat Outsiders t-stat Outside Blockholders lower bound upper bound
Figure 5: The ﬁgure shows the t-tests (adjusted for clustering of the returns at the ﬁrm level) for
Purchases and Sales transactions respectively, at diﬀerent horizons
79Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns













































































Figure 6: The ﬁgure reports the second moment of the cross section of cumulative market adjusted
returns for Purchases and Sales transactions respectively, at diﬀerent horizons
80